Marshal Bessieres
on Horseback
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The campaign that ended in the battle of Fuentos de Onoro was the aftermath of Marshal Masséna’s retreat from Portugal early in 1811. The poor condition of his army had forced Masséna to retreat all the way into Leon, leaving the Portuguese fortress of Almeida and the Spanish fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo exposed to British and Portuguese attacks. A lack of siege equipment and the proximity of the French meant that Wellington was not able to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, but Almeida was more vulnerable, for Masséna had retreated to Salamanca, Toro and Zamora, seventy miles to the east. The nearest French troops were part of the 9th Corps under General Drouet, who had retreated across the Agueda River, between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo after a brief clash with the British on 7 April. By 11 April even Drouet had pulled back as far as San Muñoz, just over twenty miles east of Ciudad Rodrigo.
Wellington believed that he would be able to starve out the defenders of Almeida before Masséna’s army could recover sufficiently to interfere. There was certainly no chance of carrying out a regular siege, for the British had no heavy guns whatsoever, and the few engineers were needed further south, for Beresford’s siege of Badajoz.
A lack of supplies forced Wellington to spread his army out in the area between the Coa and Agueda rivers. The Light Division with two cavalry regiments was sent forward to watch Ciudad Rodrigo and Drouet’s corps, the 6th Division and Pack’s Portuguese troops carried out the actual blockade of Almeida, the 5th Division was between the two and the remaining three divisions of the army were scattered along the Portuguese border, guarding the main road from Spain. Although Wellington did not expect Masséna to appear, the entire army could be concentrated in a single day’s march if needed. With the position in the north apparently secure, Wellington left for a flying visit to Beresford’s theatre of operations in Estremadura. He was absent from the army around Almeida from 15-29 April, a move which played a part in encouraging the French to move.
While Wellington was absent, Masséna was gathering his forces ready to make an attempt to break through to Almeida. He called on Marshal Bessières for help, and received 1,700 cavalry, one battery of horse artillery, thirty teams of gun-horses, and Bessières himself. The present of a hostile fellow marshal in his army can hardly have helped Masséna.
The combined French force was 48,000 strong (42,000 infantry, 4,500 cavalry and 38 guns). It was fully assembled at Ciudad Rodrigo on 1 May, and on the following day crossed the Agueda heading for the Portuguese border close to Fuentes de Oñoro.
Wellington’s spies had kept him well informed about the French movements. He had returned to his army on 29 April, and by the time Masséna began to move had concentrated his British and Portuguese troops on his chosen battlefield at Fuentes de Oñoro. The Allied army was smaller than the French force, with 34,000 infantry and 1,850 cavalry, but for once did have more guns than the French – 48 compared to 38.
Wellington had found a reasonably secure position on a ridge that ran north from the village of Fuentes de Oñoro to the ruins of Fort Concepcion. The only weakness was on the Allied right, where there was little to stop the French outflanking the Allied line.
The battle of Fuentes de Oñoro (3-5 May 1811) saw Masséna make two attempts to break Wellington’s line. On 3 May he launched a frontal assault against the village, which was repulsed at a cost of 652 casualties. After spending the next day scouting out Wellington’s position, Masséna attempted to attack around the Allied right. This attack hit the isolated British 7th Division, which had been posted at Pozo Bello in case Masséna made a small scale attempt to force the Allied flanks. The two battalions posted in Pozo Bello were forced to retreat, suffering heavy losses in the fighting, but then Wellington sent in the Light Division to rescue the 7th, while the rest of his army formed a new line with Fuentes de Oñoro at the centre. Masséna then made a determined attempt break through the Allied lines around the village. His problem was that the village had to be captured before the main Allied line could be attacked, but although Fuentes de Oñoro did briefly fall into French hands, the attack eventually failed.
This failure ended the battle. The Allies had suffered 1,452 casualties, the French 2,192, and they were no closer to breaking the blockade of Almeida. Masséna now abandoned any further attempts to reach the besieged town, and instead ordered General Brennier to attempt to break out of the besieged town. This effort really should have failed. Brennier had 1,300 men, while the town was surrounded by three entire brigades, but the British troops were posted too far from the town. After mining the walls, Brennier made his breakout on the night of 10-11 May. The Allied troops outside Almeida were woken by the explosions that destroyed the eastern and northern sections of the defences. A series of errors allowed the French force to reach safety across the bridge at Barba del Puerco, although Brennier did lose 360 men during the retreat.
This ended the fighting on the northern front for some time. Wellington was soon on the move, heading south with much of his army to conduct the second siege of Badajoz.
Napoleon had already decided to replace Masséna with Marshal Marmont after receiving detailed news about the retreat from Portugal. Marmont had initially been ordered to Spain on 15 April to replace Ney at the head of the 6th Corps, and did not receive the order to replace Masséna until 10 May, taking up his new command on 12 May. Two weeks later Marmont learnt of Soult’s defeat at Albuera, and began to move his entire army south to help raise the siege of Badajoz.
The Light Division in the Peninsular war 1808-1811, Tim Saunders and Rob Yuill.
Looks at the history of the units that would become the Light Division, and the early activities of the division itself, from Wellington’s first campaign in 1808, through Sir John Moore’s time in charge and on to Bucaco Ridge the Lines of Torres Vedra and the French retreat back into Spain. Uses a wider range of sources than most (although does include the famous Rifleman Harris), so we get a better picture of the overall activities of the division(Read Full Review)
A History of the Peninsular War vol.4: December 1810-December 1811 - Massena's Retreat, Fuentos de Onoro, Albuera, Tarragona, Sir Charles Oman. The main focus of this fourth volume in Oman's history of the Peninsular War is the year long duel between Wellington and the French on the borders of Portugal, which saw the British make a series of attacks across the border, most of which were repulsed by strong concentrations of French troops. Despite the apparent lack of progress, this was the period that saw the French lose the initiative to Wellington.
The Spanish Ulcer, A History of the Peninsular War, David Gates. An excellent single volume history of the Peninsular War, which when it was published was the first really good English language history of the entire war since Oman. This is a well balanced work with detailed coverage of those campaigns conducted entirely by Spanish armies, as well as the better known British intervention in Portugal and Spain.
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