Official Records of the Rebellion

[p.601]

No. 74.

Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S.. Army, commanding division, of operations April 6 to May 9.

HEADQUARTERS, January 11, 1863.

MAJOR: I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill of the battle of Williamsburg. The report is just received. There are many reasons to think that the battle was an important one, and a great deal of the credit of it is due to Major-General Hill and his gallant division.

I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. LONG STREET,

Lieutenant- General, Commanding Corps.

Maj. W. H. TAYLOR,

Assistant Adjutant- General.

[Inclosure]

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report the part taken by my division from the time of leaving the Rapidan until after the battle of Williamsburg:

The division left the Rapidan on April 6, 1862, and the advance brigade (Griffith’s) reached Grove’s Wharf, on the James, on the 9th. I was immediately assigned to the command of the left wing of the line of defense, extending from below Wynn’s Mill to York River, a distance of about 6 miles. After the arrival of my whole command we had but about 15,000 men, extending over a line about 12 miles long. The defenses were of the weakest character, and the radical mistake had been made of leaving the dense timber standing almost within stone’s throw of the redoubts. The fire of the Yankee sharpshooters was, therefore, very annoying during the whole siege. No line of intrenchments or rifle pits extended along the banks of the Warwick, and there was consequently no shelter against the superior artillery of the Yankees. Yorktown itself was surrounded by a most defective system of fortifications. The magazines were of the flimsiest character, and the gun which enfiladed one face would give a reverse fire on another. Heavy details were kept at work day and night to remedy the defects, strengthen the intrenchments, and secure shelter for the men.

The Yankee force in our front was enormous, and it has since been ascertained to have amounted to 158,000 men. The cautious leader of this immense host seemed, however, unwilling to risk an assault, though a determined attack of one-third of his force must have been successful. Two abortive attempts to pierce our lines were made. The most formidable of these was at Lee’s Mill. It was badly managed by the Yankees and was a bloody repulse. After this McClellan commenced the surer if not more gallant method of the sap. He fell back some distance and began ditching, and waited for his mortars and siege guns.

Major-Generals Smith and Longstreet arrived with their divisions, and General Joseph E. Johnston assumed command. General Magruder was given charge of the right, General Longstreet of the center, General Smith of the reserves, and I of the left, including Yorktown and Gloucester Point.

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The gunboats of the Yankees were specially directed to the annoyance of Yorktown and Gloucester Point, but thieves and marauders are always cowardly, and the Yankee pirates seldom ventured within range of our guns, contenting themselves with a distant cannonade. Thousands of shells were thrown in and around these two places, crowded with troops and horses, moving carelessly in. all directions, and yet there were but 2 men killed and not a single horse.

Finding that the Yankees were not likely to attack by water, many of the heavy guns were moved from the river banks and placed on the land side. Heavy traverses had to be constructed and bomb-proofs erected, and work of almost every conceivable kind to be done. The weather was wet and cold, and the men were generally without tents. One-third of the men had to be kept in the wet trenches day and night. Fatigue, watching, cold, and wet told on the health of the troops, and the hospitals were soon crowded. The powder was carefully husbanded at first, but learning that the position would be evacuated, I resolved to spend all our heavy ammunition upon the “restorers of the Union.” Their working parties were impeded and reconnaissances made hazardous.

The whole line was evacuated on the night of May 3. The better to deceive the Yankees, a furious cannonade was kept up until midnight on the 3d. The infantry abandoned the lines at dark on the 4th, leaving the heavy artillery alone to protect the place. This kept up a storm of shot and shell until midnight, as on the 3d, and then suddenly ceased, and the guns were quietly spiked. The garrison being gone, I left with staff and couriers between 12 and 1 o’clock.

The Yankees had been delayed between five and six weeks by a force on their first landing about one-twentieth as large as their own, and at no time equal to one-third of their own. They had now, however, brought up an immense number of mortars and siege guns and were just ready to open upon Yorktown, and their mortification and regret were very great at our not waiting to be pelted by long-range guns, to which we had nothing to reply.

The evacuation was eminently wise. It deprived the Yankees of their favorite diversion—firing at long range upon an unresisting foe, it enticed them away from their gunboats farther into the interior, where they were soundly thrashed in June and July.

We lost very little by the retreat, save some medical stores, which Surgeon Coffin deserted in his flight on the 1st instant. The heavy guns abandoned were all of the old navy pattern, taken at Norfolk, of little more use than so much cast iron.

We reached Williamsburg, 12 miles from Yorktown, about sunrise on the 4th and rested that day. The Yankee cavalry made its appearance, but after being charged by Hampton remained quiet and civil the balance of the day. General McLaws, however, had some successful skirmishing with the Yankee infantry. All the troops (except Longstreet’s division and mine) were moved on to Eltham’s Landing, in anticipation of an attempt to cut off our retreat.

My division left Williamsburg on the morning of the 5th, leaving Longstreet holding the earthworks around Williamsburg. The division had waded but a few miles through the mud amid slush when the heavy firing in our rear announced that Longstreet was engaged. I soon received an order from him to hurry back to his assistance.

On reaching the ground the Second Florida and Mississippi Battalion were sent to the support of the troops on the right. The brigades of Early, Rains, Featherston, and Rodes, of my division, were placed in [p.603] position on the extreme left. General Early held the frontline. He soon after reported to General Longstreet in person that there was a Yankee battery in his front on the edge of a woods and asked leave to take it with his brigade. General Longstreet approved of the movement, and directed me to accompany it. Neither Longstreet nor myself knew the precise position of the battery, and both were entirely ignorant of the ground. We, however, agreed in the general plan of getting in rear of the battery by passing through the woods to the left of its supposed position. I reconnoitered the ground as well as I could, but could not distinctly locate the battery by the sound, as it was hid by an intervening woods. I discovered, however, that there was a stream to be crossed, skirted by very dense undergrowth difficult to penetrate, in front of the right wing of Early’s brigade.

On my return this brigade was moved forward in line of battle across an open wheat field. General Early took charge of the left wing, consisting of the Twenty-fourth and Thirty-eighth Virginia Regiments, and I took charge of the Twenty-third and Fifth North Carolina Regiments, of the right wing. I directed this wing to halt as soon as the stream was crossed and undergrowth penetrated, to get the whole brigade in line, and sent my adjutant, Major Ratchford, to General Early to know whether he had got over, the thickness of the undergrowth being such that the troops on the left could not be seen. We had not halted five minutes when I heard shouting and firing immediately in our front, and a voice, which I took to be General Early’s. above all the uproar, crying, “ Follow me.” I directed the right wing to move rapidly forward, and went myself in advance of it. I soon discovered a small, open field, with an extensive woods in front of it. All on the right was an open space of many acres, in which was an earthwork occupied by our troops. I could see nothing of General Early or the Yankees. I soon, however, met an aide galloping up from him, stating that General Early was far over on the right in the open field chasing the Yankees; that he was wounded and needed re-enforcements, and had ordered a regiment in the earthwork to his support. At the same moment almost Major [P. J.] Sinclair, of the Fifth North Carolina Regiment, rode up with a message from Colonel [D. K.] McRae, of that regiment, asking permission to join the Twenty-fourth Virginia.

I regretted that our troops had gone into the open field, where the ground was so heavy that they could march with difficulty, and where they were exposed for half a mile to the full sweep of the Yankee artillery; but it was now too late to change the order of things, and there was some hope of success from a direct attack, if made rapidly. I therefore gave a reluctant consent to Colonel McRae, urging him to move forward briskly.

The woods on the left were full of Yankees, and a column moving across the open field would be exposed to a fire in flank. It was necessary, therefore, to clear it of the Yankees. I rode into it, and found there the Thirty-eighth Virginia, huddled up and in considerable confusion. The Yankee shells and balls were falling among them, and their crowded condition was such as to increase the mortality. Line of battle was formed with considerable difficulty, but when formed they were directed to move on through the woods and drive out the Yankees. The Twenty-third North Carolina Regiment had been lost sight of from the moment of being ordered to advance from the creek. It was at length found, halted by a fence. I ordered it to change front, so as to come in on the left of the Thirty-eighth Virginia and sweep the woods. The [p.604] regiment was badly drilled, and it took some time to execute this simple maneuver.

The Yankees were now rapidly falling back to an abandoned earthwork on the edge of the woods, several hundred yards from the earthwork from which General Early had ordered a regiment to his support. The Twenty-fourth Virginia and Fifth North Carolina were pressing on vigorously through the heavy ground, exposed to a most murderous fire, but not halting or faltering for a moment. There was but one possible chance of success, and that was to push rapidly forward, under the crest of the hill, the regiment (Sixth South Carolina, I think) which General Early had ordered to his support, so as to gain the flank of the earthwork, while the troops in the woods should gain its rear. I found the South Carolina regiment halted, and in spite of my efforts and those of my staff, together with the active exertions of Captain Early (of the general’s staff), the movement was made slowly.

We had gone but a short distance when the Thirty-eighth Virginia joined us, having emerged from the woods contrary to orders. These two regiments moved on, but the attack of the Twenty -fourth Virginia and Fifth North Carolina was made without their co-operation and ended in a bloody repulse.

Colonel McRae lost his lieutenant-colonel, John C. Badham, a gallant and accomplished officer, and one-half of his men. Col. W. R. Terry and Lieut. Col. Peter Hairston, Twenty-fourth Virginia, were severely wounded, and a large proportion of officers and men were struck down. The other regiments were withdrawn to the cover of the woods, where, to my surprise, I found the Twenty-third North Carolina halted. Why this halt was made I never knew.

The turning of the Yankee position was still deemed practicable, but I soon found that the confusion was so great, arising mainly from the want of drill and discipline, that all idea of farther advance was abandoned.

Rains’ brigade was brought into the woods and all our wounded removed from it, after which we retired back to the wheat field. It was now fairly dark, and the division remained in line of battle all night, without fire, during a cold and wet rain. The night was one of almost unparalleled suffering. With two divisions McClellan had received such a check that he immediately telegraphed for re-enforcemeuts, stating that “Joe Johnston is before me with an army greater than my own.”

Longstreet, on our right, aided by my two regiments, had been completely successful, not only checking, but driving the Yankees, capturing many fine pieces of artillery and taking about 500 prisoners.

On our left we bad been less fortunate. We unquestionably lost more men than the Yankees and failed to take their guns but we drove them back nearly a mile and made an important diversion in favor of our troops on the right, which were at that time sorely pressed. It was afterward ascertained that McClellan was so much alarmed by this movement on our left that he hastened there in person with every available man he could bring up.

The courage exhibited by the Fifth North Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia made, too, a wonderful impression upon the Yankees, and doubtless much of the caution exhibited in their subsequent movements was due to the terror inspired by the heroism of those noble regiments. History has no example of a more daring charge.

I have always regretted that General Early, carried away by his impetuous and enthusiastic courage, advanced so far into the open [p.605] field. Whether he would have succeeded had the other two regiments of his brigade (the Twenty-third North Carolina and Thirty-eighth Virginia) pushed rapidly on must forever remain an undecided question. There was no lack of coolness or zeal upon the part of the commanders of these regiments, but they had so neglected drill and training that the simplest movements were attended with trouble and delay. My division had been remodeled at Yorktown, and I scarcely knew my officers by name. Add to this serious drawback that none of the officers knew the ground nor the position and strength of the Yankees, and that the men were badly drilled and disciplined, it cannot be wonderful that the brigade did not effect all that was expected of it; but it contributed largely to retard McClellan, to demoralize his troops, and to secure our retreat from a vigorous and harassing pursuit. I know but little of what was done by my two regiments sent in on the extreme right.

Colonel Ward, of the Second Florida, a noble, gallant, and accomplished officer, fell there at the head of his regiment. He was greatly beloved by all who knew him, and had won a high reputation for his soldierly bearing.

My division constituted the rear guard on the 6th. Thousands of soldiers had sought shelter from the storm of the night before in barns and outhouses, and it was with the utmost difficulty they could he driven out. Cold, tired, hungry, and jaded, many seemed indifferent alike to life or capture. The roads were in a truly horrible condition. Horses could with difficulty wade through the mud and slush, and to footmen the task seemed almost impossible. The straggling was enormous, but more especially on this the first day after leaving Williamsburg. The Yankee cavalry followed slowly in our rear picking up stragglers, who had too little life and energy to keep up. If they expected to rest by falling back they were miserably deceived, for they were immediately trotted to the rear under Yankee sabers.

Six miles from Williamsburg we encountered a swamp of the most formidable character. Here many wagons and ambulances were found abandoned and had to be destroyed by the rear guard. The Yankee pursuit, rendered very cautious by the battle of the day before, ceased altogether at this point. We were harassed no more on the march by the troops under the immediate command of McClellan. However, as was anticipated by General Johnston, a portion of the Yankee army landed at Eltham’s to intercept our retreat. Franklin’s whole corps had come up York River.  

Hood, with a single brigade, attacked their advance on the 7th and drove them back to their gunboats. Franklin troubled us no more. His experience gained with the Texans had been ample and satisfactory. He desired no more of it.

On the fourth day of our march from Williamsburg we reached Long Bridge, on the Chickahominy, where we halted for some days.

There had been no depots of supplies established in our rear, and the suffering of the men from hunger had been very great on the march. For three days there were no regular issues of rations, and the men subsisted on parched corn and the plunder of the neighborhood. Several thousand had thrown away their arms and straggled off to Richmond, either to procure food or to escape the perils of battle.

The reorganization of the army at Yorktown, under the elective system, had thrown out of service many of our best officers, and had much demoralized our army. The high fighting qualities exhibited by the soldiers subsequently at Seven Pines and the battles around Richmond, notwithstanding these untoward circumstances, are striking proofs of [p.606] the favor of Heaven, the justice of our cause, and the indomitable pluck of Southern troops. Our Revolutionary sires did not suffer more at Valley Forge than did our army at Yorktown and in the retreat from it. Notwithstanding the rain, mud, cold, hunger, watching, and fatigue I never heard a murmur or witnessed a single act of insubordination. The want of discipline manifested itself only in straggling, which was and still is the curse of our army. This monstrous evil can only be corrected by a more rigid government and a sterner system of punishment than have yet been introduced into our service.

The list of casualties has been previously submitted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. H. HILL,
Major. General.

Maj. G. MOXLEY SORREL,
Assistant Adjutant- General.