Official Records of the Rebellion

[p.97]

On the 29th the following dispatch was telegraphed:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—10.30 a. m.

Franklin’s corps is in motion; started about 6 a. m. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. I propose moving General Cox to Upton’s Hill to hold that important point with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna, via Freedom Hill and Hunter’s Lane. Cox has two squadrons of cavalry. Please answer at once whether [p.98] this meets your approval. I have directed Woodbury, with the Engineer Brigade, to hold Fort Lyon. Sumner detached last night two regiments to vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy. Meagher’s brigade is still at Aquia. If he moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington. Yet Franklin is too weak alone. What shall be done? No more cavalry arrived; have but three squadrons. Franklin has but 40 rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in condition to accomplish much if he meets with serious resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing order of last night. What have you from Vienna and Dranesville?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major- General.

Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.

To which the following is a reply:

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1862—12 m.

Upton’s Hill arrangement all right. We must send wagons and ammunition to

Franklin as fast as they arrive. Meagher’s brigade ordered up yesterday. Fitzhugh Lee was, it is said on good authority, in Alexandria on Sunday last for three hours. I have nothing from Dranesville.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Major-General MCCLELLAN.

On the same day the following was received from His Excellency the President:

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1862—2.30 p. m.

What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What generally?

A. LINCOLN.

Major-General McCLELLAN

To which I replied as follows:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—2.45 p. m.

The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. This by no means reliable.

I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First, to concentrate all our available forces to open communications with Pope; Second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe.

No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President.

And copy to General Halleck.

To which the following is a reply:

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1862—4.10 p. m.

Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit, “to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope,” is the right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels.

A. LINCOLN.

Major-General MCCLELLAN.

It had been officially reported to me from Washington that the enemy in strong force was moving through Vienna in the direction of the Chain Bridge, and had a large force in Vienna. This report, in connection with the dispatch of the General-in-Chief on the 28th, before noted, [p.99] induced me to direct Franklin to halt his command near Annandale until it could be determined by reconnaissances to Vienna and toward Manassas whether these reports were true. General Cox was ordered to send his small cavalry force from Upton’s Hill toward Vienna and Dranesville in one direction and toward Fairfax Court-House in the other, and Franklin to push his two squadrons as far toward Manassas as possible, in order to ascertain the true position of the enemy. With the enemy in force at Vienna and toward Lewinsville it would have been very injudicious to have pushed Franklin’s small force beyond Annandale. It must be remembered that at that time we were cut off from direct communication with General Pope; that the enemy was, by the last accounts, at Manassas in strong force, and that Franklin had only from 10,000 to 11,000 men, with an entirely insufficient force of cavalry and artillery.

In order to represent this condition of affairs in its proper light to the General-in-Chief, and to obtain definite instructions from him, I telegraphed as follows:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—12 m.

Have ordered most of the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry to report to General Barnard for scouting duty toward Rockville, Poolesville, &c.

If you apprehend a raid of cavalry on your side of river, I had better send a brigade or two of Sumner’s to near Tennallytown, where, with two or three old regiments in Forts Allen and Marcy, they can watch both Chain Bridge and Tennallytown.

Would it meet your views to post the rest of Sumner’s corps between Arlington and Fort Corcoran, whence they can either support Cox, Franklin, or Chain Bridge, and even Tennallytown?

Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 for duty.

How far do you wish this force to advance?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major- General.

Major-General HALLECK, Washington.

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—1 p. m.

I anxiously await reply to my last dispatch in regard to Sumner. Wish to give the order at once.

Please authorize me to attach new regiments permanently to my old brigades. I can do much good to old and new troops in that way. I shall endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts Allen and Marcy—at least with strong advance guards. I wish to hold the line through Prospect Hill, Mackall’s, Minor’s, and Hall’s Hill. This will give us timely warning. Shall I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicinity, including Franklin, who I really think ought not, under present circumstances, to advance beyond Annandale?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major- General.

General HALLECK.

On the same day I received a dispatch from the General-in-Chief, in which he asks me why I halted Franklin in Annandale, to which I replied as follows:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—8 p. m.

By referring to my telegrams of 10.30 a. m., 12 m., and 1 p. m., together with your reply of 2.48 p. m., you will see why Franklin’s corps halted at Annandale. His small cavalry force—all I had to give him—was ordered to push on as far as possible toward Manassas. It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Annandale, under the circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna.

General Franklin remained here until about 1 p. m., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin’s movements of to-morrow.

[p.100]

I have sent to Colonel Haupt to push out construction and supply trains as soon as possible; General Tyler to furnish the necessary guards.

I hare directed General Banks’ supply trains to start out to-night at least as far as Annandale, with an escort from General Tyler.

In regard to to-morrow’s movements I desire definite instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders when I have simply exercised the discretion yon committed to me.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.

On the same evening I sent the following dispatches:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—10 p. m.

Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to General Franklin to place himself in communication with General Pope as soon as possible, and at the same time cover the transit of Pope’s supplies. Orders have been given for railway and wagon trains to move to Pope with least possible delay.

I am having inspections made of all the forts around the city by members of my staff, with instructions to give all requisite orders. I inspected Worth and Ward myself this evening; found them in good order. Reports, so far as heard from, are favorable as to condition of works.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major- General.

Major-General HALLECK, Washington.

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—10 p. m.

Your dispatch received. Franklin’s corps has been ordered to march at 6 o’clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has about 14,000 infantry, without cavalry or artillery, here. Cox’s brigade of four regiments is here, with two batteries of artillery. Men of two regiments, much fatigued. came in to-day. Tyler’s brigade of three new regiments, but little drilled, is also here. All these troops will be ordered to hold themselves ready to march to-morrow morning, and all except Franklin’s to await further orders. If you wish any of them to move toward Manassas please inform me.

Colonel Waaguer, Second New York Artillery, has just come in from the front. He reports strong infantry and cavalry force of rebels near Fairfax Court-House. Reports rumors from various sources that Lee and Stuart, with large forces, are at Manassas; that the enemy with 120,000 men intend advancing on the forts near Arlington and Chain Bridge, with a view of attacking Washington and Baltimore.

General Barnard telegraphs me to-night that the length of the line of fortifications on this side of the Potomac requires 2,000 additional artillerymen, and additional troops to defend intervals, according to circumstances. At all events, he says, an old regiment should be added to the force at Chain Bridge, and a few regiments distributed along the lines, to give confidence to our new troops. I agree with him fully, and think our fortifications along the upper part of our line on this side of the river very unsafe with their present garrisons, and the movements of the enemy seem to indicate an attack upon those works.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major General.

General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in- Chief U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.