Official Records of the Rebellion

[p.57]

On the 26th a circular was sent to the corps commanders on the right bank of the river, asking them how many of their troops could be spared to re-enforce General Porter, after retaining sufficient to hold their positions for twenty-four hours.
To this the following replies were received:

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS, June 26—4 p. m.

I think I can hold the intrenchments with four brigades for twenty-four hours. That would leave two brigades disposable for service on the other side of the river, but the men are so tired and worn-out that I fear they would not be in a condition to fight after making a march of any distance. * *

S. P. HEINTZELMAN,
Brigadier- General.

General R. B. MARCY.

Telegrams from General Heintzelman, on the 25th and 26th, had indicated that the enemy was in large force in front of Generals Hooker and Kearny, and on the Charles City road (Longstreet, Hill, and Huger), and General Heintzelman expressed the opinion, on the night of the 25th, that he could not hold his advanced position without re-enforcements.

General Keyes telegraphed:

As to how many men will be able to hold this position for twenty-four hours, I must answer, all I have, if the enemy is as strong as ever in front., it having at all times appeared to me that our forces on this flank are small enough.

On the morning of the 27th the following dispatch was sent to General Sumner:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 27—8.45 a. m.

General Smith just reports that six or eight regiments have moved down to the woods in front of General Sumner.

R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff.

General E. V. SUMNER, Commanding Second Army Corps.

At 11 a. m. General Sumner telegraphed as follows:

The enemy threaten an attack on my right, near Smith.

At 12.30 p. m. he telegraphed:

Sharp shelling on both sides.

At 2.45 p. m.:

Sharp musketry firing in front of Burns. We are replying with artillery and infantry. The man on the lookout reports some troops drawn up in line of battle about opposite my right and Smith’s left; the number cannot be made out.

In accordance with orders given on the night of the 26th, General Slocum’s division commenced crossing the river to support General Porter soon after daybreak on the morning of the 27th; but as the firing in front of General Porter ceased the movement was suspended. At 2 p. m. General Porter called for re-enforcements. I ordered them at once, and at 3.25 p. m. sent him the following:

Slocum is now crossing Alexander’s Bridge with his whole command. Enemy has commenced an infantry attack on Smith’s left. I have ordered down Sumner’s and Heintzelman’s reserves, and you can count on the whole of Slocum’s. Go on as you have begun.

During the day the following dispatches were received, which will show the condition of affairs on the right bank of the Chickahominy

June 27, 1862.

General Smith thinks the enemy are massing heavy columns in the clearings to the right of James Garnett’s house and on the other side of the river opposite it. Three regiments are reported to be moving from Sumner’s to Smith’s front. The arrangements are very good, made by Smith.

W. B. FRANKLIN,
Brigadier- General.

Col. A. V. COLBURN, Assistant Adjutant-General.

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Afterwards he telegraphed:

The enemy has begun an attack on Smith’s left with infantry. I know no details.

Afterwards the following:

The enemy has opened on Smith from a battery of three pieces to the right of the White house. Our shells are bursting well, and Smith thinks Sumner will soon have a cross-fire upon them that will silence them.

Afterwards (at 5.50 p. m.) the following was sent to General Keyes:

Please send one brigade of Couch’s division to these headquarters without a moment’s delay. A staff officer will be here to direct the brigade where to go.

Subsequently the following was sent to Generals Sumner and Franklin :

Is there any sign of the enemy being in force in your front? Can you spare any more force to be sent to General Porter! Answer at once.

At 5.15 p. in. the following was received from General Franklin:

I do not think it prudent to take any more troops from here at present.

General Sumner replied as follows:

If the general desires to trust the defense of my position to my front line alone, I can send French with three regiments, and Meagher with his brigade, to the right. Everything is so uncertain that I think it would be hazardous to do it.

These two brigades were sent to re-enforce General Porter, as has been observed.
At 5.25 p. m. I sent the following to General Franklin:

Porter is hard pressed. It is not a question of prudence, but of possibilities. Can you possibly maintain your position until dark with two brigades? I have ordered eight regiments of Sumner’s to support Porter; one brigade of Couch’s to this place; Heintzelman’s reserve to go in rear of Sumner. If possible send a brigade to support Porter. It should follow the regiments ordered from Sumner.

At 7.3.5 p. in. the following was sent to General Sumner:

If it is possible send another brigade to re-enforce General Smith. It is said three heavy columns of infantry are moving on him.

From the foregoing dispatches it will be seen that all disposable troops were sent from the right bank of the river to re-enforce General Porter, and that the corps commanders were left with smaller forces to hold their positions than they deemed adequate. To have done more, even though Porter’s reverse had been prevented, would have had the still more disastrous result of imperiling the whole movement across the peninsula.

The operations of this day proved the numerical superiority of the enemy, and made it evident that while he had a large army on the left hank of the Chickahominy, which had already turned our right and was in position to intercept the communications with our depot at the White house, he was also in large force between our army and Richmond. I therefore effected a junction of our forces.

This might probably have been executed on either side of the Chickahominy, and if the concentration had been effected on the left bank it is possible we might with our entire force have defeated the enemy there; but at that time they held the roads leading to the White House, so that it would have been impossible to have sent forward supply trains in advance of the army in that direction, and the guarding of those trains would have seriously embarrassed our operations in the battle. We would have been compelled to fight if concentrated on that bank of the river. Moreover, we would at once have been followed by [p.60] the enemy’s forces upon the Richmond side of the river operating upon our rear, and if in the chances of war we had been ourselves defeated in the effort, we would have been forced to fall back to the White House, and probably to Fort Monroe, and as both our flanks and rear would then have been entirely exposed, our entire supply train, if not the greater part of the army itself, might have been lost. The movements of the enemy showed that they expected this, and, as they themselves acknowledged, they were prepared to cut off our retreat in that direction. I therefore concentrated all our forces on the right bank of the river. During the night of the 26th and morning of the 27th all our wagons, heavy gnus, &c., were gathered there.

It may be asked, why, after the concentration of our forces on the right bank of the Chickahominy, with a large part of the enemy drawn away from Richmond upon the opposite side, I did not, instead of striking for James River, 15 miles below that place, at once march directly on Richmond. It will be remembered that at this juncture the enemy was on our rear, and there was every reason to believe that he would sever our communications with the supply depot at the White House. We had on hand but a limited amount of rations, and if we had advanced directly on Richmond it would have required considerable time to carry the strong works around that place, during which our men would have been destitute of food, and even if Richmond had fallen before our arms the enemy could still have occupied our supply communications between that place and the gunboats and turned the disaster into victory. If, on the other hand, the enemy had concentrated all his forces at Richmond during the progress of our attack, and we had been defeated, we must in all probability have lost our trains before reaching the flotilla.

The battles which continued day after day in the progress of our flank movement to the James River, with the exception of the one at Gaines’ Mill, were successes to our arms, and the closing engagement at Malvern Hill was the most decisive of all.

On the evening of the 27th of June I assembled the corps commanders at my headquarters and informed them of my plan, its reasons, and my choice of route and method of execution.

General Keyes was directed to move his corps, with its artillery and baggage, across the White Oak Swamp Bridge and to seize strong positions on the opposite side of the swamp, to cover the passage of the other troops and trains.