official Records of the Rebellion

[p.31]

The work upon the bridges was commenced at once and pushed forward with great vigor; but the rains, which from day to day continued to fall, flooded the valley, and raised the water to a greater height than had been known for twenty years.

This demolished a great amount of our labor, and our first bridges, with their approaches, which were not made with reference to such extreme high water, were carried off or rendered impassable. We were obliged, with immense labor, to construct others, much longer, more elevated, and stable. Our men worked in the water, exposed to the enemy’s fire from the opposite bank.

On the 25th of May I received the following telegram:

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1862.

Your dispatch received. General Banks was at Strasburg, with about 6,000 men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered at various places. On the 23d a rebel force of 7,000 to 10,000 fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th (yesterday) pushed on to get north of Banks, on the road to Winchester. General Banks ran a race with then, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which General Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal, with 10,000 troops, following up and supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks. Also that another force of 10,000 is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. Stripped bare, as we are here, I will do all we can to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper’s Ferry or above. McDowell has about 20,000 of his forces moving back to the vicinity of Front Royal, and Frémont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg; both these movements intended to get in the enemy’s rear.

One more of McDowell’s brigades is ordered through here to Harper’s Ferry; the rest of his forces remain for the present at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper’s Ferry, supplying their places in some sort by calling in militia from the adjacent States. We [p.32] also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper’s Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one at that point. This is now our situation.

If McDowell’s force was now beyond our reach we should be entirely helpless. Apprehensions of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, have always been my reason for withholding McDowell’s from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you have.

A. LINCOLN,
President.

Major-General MCCLELLAN.

On the 25th the following was also received:

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1862—2 p. m.

The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive General Banks before him— precisely in what force we cannot tell. He is also threatening Leesburg, and Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, from both north and south—in precisely what force we cannot tell. I think the movement is a general and concerted one, such as would not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defense of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly.

A. LINCOLN,
President.

Major-General MCCLELLAN.

To which I replied as follows:

COLD HARBOR, May 25, 1862.

Telegram received. Independently of it, the time is very near when I shall attack Richmond. The object of the movement is probably to prevent re-enforcements being sent to me. All the information obtained from balloons, deserters, prisoners, and contrabands agrees in the statement that the mass of the rebel troops are still in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, ready to defend it. I have no knowledge of Banks’ position and force nor what there is at Manassas; therefore cannot form a definite opinion as to the force against him.

I have two corps across Chickahominy, within 6 miles of Richmond; the others on this side at other crossings within same distance, and ready to cross when bridges are completed.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President.

On the 26th I received the following:

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862—12.40 a. m.

We have General Banks’ official report. He has saved his army and baggage and has made a safe retreat to the river, and is probably safe at Williamsport. He reports the attacking force at 15,000.

A. LINCOLN.
President.

Major-General MCCLELLAN.

On the 26th I received the following:

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862.

Can you not cut the Aquia Creek Railroad? Also, what impression have you as to intrenched works for you to contend with in front of Richmond? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city?

A. LINCOLN,
President.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

On the same day I sent the following:

COLD HARBOR, May 26, 1862.

Have cut the Virginia Central Road in three places between Hanover Court-House and the Chickahominy. Will try to cut the other. I do not think Richmond intrenchments formidable, but am not certain. Hope very soon to be within shelling distance. [p.33] Have railroad in operation from White House to Chickahominy. Hope to have Chickahominy Bridge repaired to-night. Nothing of interest to-day.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President.

The interruption of the railroad here referred to was effected by the command of Brigadier-General Stoneman, and was intended to prevent the enemy from drawing supplies by that route or from sending re-enforcements to Anderson or Jackson.

At 10 a. m. I sent also the following dispatch:

Telegrams of last night received. I am glad to know affairs are not so bad as might have been. I would earnestly call your attention to my instructions to General Banks of March 16, to General Wadsworth of same date, and to my letter of April 1 to the Adjutant-General. I cannot but think that a prompt return to the principles there laid down would relieve all probability of danger. I will forward copies by mail. I beg to urge the importance of Manassas and Front Royal in contradistinction to Fredericksburg.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major- General.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President.

Later on the 26th I sent the following:

CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE,
May 26, 1862—7.30 p. m.

Have arranged to carry out your last orders. We are quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last struggle. Situated as I am, I feel forced to take every possible precaution against disaster and to secure my flanks against the probably superior force in front of me. My arrangements for tomorrow are very important, and, if successful, will leave me free to strike on the return of the force detached.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President.