Official Records of the Rebellion

[p.19]

The position in which General Stoneman encountered the enemy is about 4 miles in extent, the right resting on College Creek and the left on Queen’s Creek, nearly three-fourths of its front being covered by tributaries of these two creeks, upon which there are ponds.

The ground between the heads of the boundary streams is a cultivated plain, across which a line of detached works had been constructed, consisting of Fort Magruder, a large work in the center with a bastion front, and twelve other redoubts and epaulements for field guns.

The parapet of Fort Magruder is about 6 feet high and 9 feet thick, the ditch 9 feet wide and 9 feet deep, filled with water. The length of the interior crest is about 600 yards. The redoubts have strong profiles, but are of small dimensions, having faces of about 40 yards. The woods in front of the position were felled and the open ground in front of the works was dotted with numerous rifle pits.

The roads leading from the lower part of the Peninsula to Williamsburg—one along the York River (the Yorktown road) and the other [p.20] along the James (the Lee’s Mill road)—unite between the heads of the tributary streams a short distance in front of Fort Magruder, by which they are commanded, and debouch from the woods just before uniting. A branch from the James River road leaves it about 1 miles below Fort Magruder, and unites with the road from Allen’s Landing to Williamsburg, which crosses the tributary of College Creek over a dam at the outlet of a pond and passes just in rear of the line of works, being commanded by the three redoubts on the right of the line. At about the same distance from Fort Magruder a branch leaves the York River road and crosses the tributary of Queen’s Creek on a dam, and passing over the position and through the works in its rear finally enters Williamsburg. This road is commanded by redoubts on the left of the line of the works.

General Stoneman debouched from the woods with his advance guard (consisting of a part of the First U. S. Cavalry and one section of Gibson’s battery, under the command of General Cooke), and the enemy immediately opened on him with several field Pieces from Fort Magruder, having the correct range, and doing some execution. Gibson’s battery was brought into position as rapidly as the deep mud would permit and returned the fire, while the Sixth U. S. Cavalry was sent to feel the enemy’s left. This regiment passed one redoubt, which it found unoccupied, and appeared in the rear of a second, when a strong cavalry force, with infantry and artillery, came down upon it; whereupon the regiment was withdrawn. The rear squadron, under command of Captain Sanders, repelled a charge of the enemy’s cavalry in the most gallant manner. In the meantime the enemy was being reinforced by infantry, and the artillery fire becoming very hot, General Stoneman, having no infantry to carry the works, ordered the withdrawal of the battery. This was accomplished, with the exception of one piece, which could not be extricated from the mud. The enemy attempted to prevent the movement, but their charges were met by the First U. S. Cavalry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Grier, and they were driven back, losing several officers and one stand of colors. General Stoneman then took up a defensive position a short distance in the rear of the first, to await the arrival of the infantry.

The advance of General Smith’s column reached Skiff Creek about 11.30 o’clock, and found the bridge over that stream in flames and the road impassable. A practicable route to the Yorktown road having been discovered, the division, by order of General Sumner, moved on by that road, and reached General Stoneman’s position about 5.30 o’clock. General Sumner, arriving with it, assumed command.

Generals Heintzelman and Keyes also arrived. During the afternoon of the 4th, near the Half-way House, the head of General Hooker’s column encountered Smith’s division filing into the road, and was obliged to halt between three and four hours until it had passed. General Hooker then followed on, and at Cheesecake Church turned off, by General Heintzelman’s direction, taking a cross road, and moved out on the Lee’s Mill road, thus changing places with General Smith. Marching part of the night, he came in sight of Fort Magruder early in the morning of the 5th.

General Smith’s division having been deployed, General Sumner ordered an attack on the works in his front; but the lines having been thrown into confusion while moving through the dense forest and darkness coming on, the attempt for that night was abandoned. The troops bivouacked in the woods, and a heavy rain began, which continued [p.21] until the morning of the 6th, making the roads, already in very bad condition, almost impassable.

During the morning of the 5th General Sumner reconnoitered the position in his front, and at 11 o’clock ordered Hancock’s brigade, of Smith’s division, to take possession of a work on the enemy’s left, which had been found to be unoccupied. The remainder of Smith’s division occupied the woods in front without being actually engaged.

The divisions of Couch and Casey had received orders during the night to march at daylight, but on account of the terrible condition of the roads and other impediments were not able to reach the field until after 1 o’clock p. m., at which time the first brigade of Couch’s division arrived, and was posted in the center, on Hooker’s right. The other two brigades came up during the afternoon, followed by Casey’s division.

In the mean time General Hooker, having reconnoitered the enemy’s position, began the attack at 7.30 a. m., and for a while silenced the guns of Fort Magruder and cleared the ground in his front; but the enemy being continually re-enforced, until their strength greatly exceeded his, made attack after attack, endeavoring to turn his left.

For several hours his division struggled gallantly against the superior numbers of the enemy. Five guns of Webber’s battery were lost, and between 3 and 4 o’clock his ammunition began to give out. The loss had been heavy and the exhaustion of the troops was very great. At this time the division of General Kearny came up, who at 9 a. m. had received orders to re-enforce Hooker, and who had succeeded by the greatest exertions in passing Casey’s troops and pushing on to the front through the deep mud. General Kearny at once gallantly attacked and thereby prevented the loss of another battery, and drove the enemy back at every point, enabling General Hooker to extricate himself from his position and withdraw his wearied troops. Peck’s brigade, of Couch’s division, as has been mentioned before, was immediately on its arrival ordered by General Sumner to deploy on Hooker’s right. This was promptly done, and the attacks of the enemy at that point were repulsed. General Peck held his position until late in the afternoon, when he was relieved by the other two brigades of Couch’s division, and they were in quiet possession of the ground, when night closed the contest. The vigorous action of these troops relieved General Hooker considerably. General Emory had been left with his command on the night of the 4th to guard the branch of the Lee’s Mill road which leads to Allen’s farm, and on the morning of the 5th it was ascertained that by this route the enemy’s right could be turned. A request for infantry for this purpose was made to General Heintzelman, who late in the afternoon sent four regiments and two batteries of Kearny’s division— the first disposable troops he had—and directed General Emory to make the attack. With these re-enforcements his force amounted to about 3,000 men and three batteries. General Emory, on account of want of knowledge of the ground and the lateness of the hour, did not succeed in this movement. It involved some risks, but if successful might have produced important results.

At 11 a. m., as before mentioned, General Smith received orders from General Sumner to send one brigade across a dam on our right, to occupy a redoubt on the left of the enemy’s line. Hancock’s brigade was selected for this purpose. He crossed the dam, took possession of the first redoubt, and afterward finding the second one vacated he occupied that also, and sent for re-enforcements to enable him to advance farther and take the next redoubt, which commanded [p.22] the plain between his position and Fort Magruder, and would have enabled him to take in reverse and cut the communication of the troops engaged with Generals Hooker and Kearny.

The enemy soon began to show himself in strength before him, and as his rear and right flank were somewhat exposed, he repeated his request for re-enforcements. General Smith was twice ordered to join him with the rest of his division, but each time the order was countermanded at the moment of execution, General Sumner not being willing to weaken the center. At length, in reply to General Hancock’s repeated messages for more troops, General Sumner sent him an order to fall back to his first position, the execution of which General Hancock deferred as long as possible, being unwilling to give up the advantage already gained and fearing to expose his command by such a movement.

During the progress of these events I had remained at Yorktown to complete the preparations for the departure of General Franklin’s and other troops to West Point by water and to make the necessary arrangements with the naval commander for his co-operation.

By pushing General Franklin, well supported by water, to the right bank of the Pamunkey, opposite West Point, it was hoped to force the enemy to abandon whatever works he might have on the Peninsula below that point or be cut off. It was of paramount importance that the arrangements to this end should be promptly made at an early hour of the morning. I had sent two of my aides (Lieuteuant-Colonel Sweitzer and Major Hammerstein) to observe the operations in front, with instructions to report to me everything of importance that might occur. I received no information from them leading me to suppose that there was anything occurring of more importance than a simple affair of a rear guard until about 1 p. m., when a dispatch arrived from one of them that everything was not progressing favorably. This was confirmed a few minutes later by the reports of Governor Sprague and Major Hammerstein, who came directly from the scene of action.

Completing the necessary arrangements, I returned to my camp without delay, rode rapidly to the front, a distance of some 14 miles, through roads much obstructed by troops amid wagons, and reached the field between 4 and 5 p. m., in time to take a rapid survey of the ground. I soon learned that there was no direct communication between our center and the left, under General Heintzelman. The center was chiefly in the nearer edge of the woods, situated between us and the enemy. As heavy firing was heard in the direction of General Hancock’s command, I immediately ordered General Smith to proceed with his two remaining brigades to support that part of the line. General Naglee, with his brigade, received similar orders. I then directed our center to advance to the farther edge of the woods mentioned above, which was done, and I attempted to open direct communication with General Heintzelman, but was prevented by the marshy state of the ground in the direction in which the attempt was made.

Before Generals Smith and Naglee could reach the field of General Hancock’s operations, although they moved with great rapidity, he had been confronted by a superior force. Feigning to retreat slowly, he awaited their onset and then turned upon them, and after some terrific volleys of musketry he charged them with the bayonet, routing and dispersing their whole force, killing, wounding, and capturing from 500 to 600 men; he himself losing only 31 men. This was one of the most brilliant engagements of the war, and General Hancock merits the [p.23] highest praise for the soldierly qualities displayed and his perfect appreciation of the vital importance of his position.

Night put an end to the operations here, and all the troops who had been engaged in this contest slept on the muddy field, without shelter and many without food.

Notwithstanding the report I received from General Heintzelman during the night that General Hooker’s division had suffered so much that it could not be relied upon next day and that Kearny’s could not do more than hold its own without re-enforcements, being satisfied that the result of Hancock’s engagement was to give us possession of the decisive point of the battle-field, during the night I countermanded the order for the advance of the divisions of Sedgwick and Richardson, and directed them to return to Yorktown, to proceed to West Point by water.

Our loss during the day, the greater part of which was sustained by Hooker’s division, was as follows: Killed, 456; wounded, 1,400; missing, 372. Total, 2,228.