Official Records of the Rebellion

[p.16]

The following extracts from the report of the chief engineer (Brig. Gen. J. G. Barnard) embody the result of our reconnaissances, and give with some degree of detail the character and strength of the defenses of Yorktown and the Warwick and some of the obstacles which the army contended against and overcame:

Extracts from General Barnard’s report.

The accompanying drawing (map No. 2) gives with accuracy the outline and armament of the fortifications of Yorktown proper, with the detached works immediately connected with it.

The three bastioned fronts looking toward our approaches appear to have been earliest built, and have about 15 feet thickness of parapet and 8 feet to 10 feet depth of ditch, the width varying much, but never being less at top of scarp than 15 feet— I think generally much more.

The works extending around the town from the western salient of fronts just mentioned appeared to have been finished during the past winter and spring. They have formidable profiles, 18 feet thickness of parapet and generally 10 feet depth of ditch. The water batteries had generally 18 feet parapet; the guns in barbette. They were (as well as all the works mentioned) carefully constructed, with well-made sod revetments.

There were numerous traverses between the guns, and ample magazines; how sufficient in bomb-proof qualities I am unable to say. The two first guns of the work on the heights bear upon the water as well as the land, and were of heavy caliber. The list herewith gives all the guns in position or for which there were emplacements. The vacant emplacements were all occupied before the evacuation by siege guns, rifled 4 ½ -inch 24-pounders and 18-pounders.

In Fort Magruder (the first exterior work) there were found one 8-inch columbiad, one 42-pounder, and one 8-inch siege howitzer, the two former in barbette. The sketch will show the emplacements for guns on field and siege carriages, making, I think, with the foregoing, twenty-two. Two of these were placed behind traverses, with embrasures covered by blindages. The two external redoubts, with the connecting parapets, formed a re-entrant with the fronts of attack, and all the guns bore on our approaches.

It will be seen, therefore, that our approaches were swept by the fire of at least forty- nine guns, nearly all of which were heavy, and many of them the most formidable guns known. Besides that, two-thirds of the guns of the water batteries and all the guns of Gloucester bore on our right batteries, though under disadvantageous circumstances.

The ravine behind which the left of the Yorktown fronts of attack was placed was not very difficult, as the heads formed depressions in front of their left, imperfectly seen by their fire, and from which access could be had to the ditches; but we could not be sure of this fact before the evacuation. The enemy held, by means of a slight breast- work and rifle trenches, a position in advance of the heads of these ravines as far forward as the burned house. The ravines which head between the Yorktown fortifications and the exterior works are deep and intricate. They were tolerably well seen, however, by the works which run westwardly from the Yorktown works, and which were too numerous and complicated to be traced on paper.

Fort Magruder, the first lunette on our left, appears to have been built at an early period. The external connection between this work was first a rifle trench, probably afterwards enlarged into a parapet, with external ditch and an emplacement for four guns in or near the small redan in the center. Behind this they had constructed numerous epaulements, with connecting boyaus not fully arranged for infantry fires, and mainly intended, probably, to protect their camps and reserves against the destructive effects of our artillery. From the red redoubt these trenches and epaulements [p.17] ran to the woods and rivulet which forms one head of the Warwick, and continue almost without break to connect with the works at Wynn’s Mill. This stream just mentioned, whatever be its name (the term “Warwick,” according to some, applying only to the tidal channel from the James River up as high as Lee’s Mill), was inundated by a number of dams from near where its head is crossed by the epaulements mentioned down to Lee’s Mill.

Below Lee’s Mill the Warwick follows a tortuous course through salt marshes of 200 yards or 300 yards in width, from which the land rises up boldly to a height of 30 or 40 feet.

The first group of works is at Wynn’s Mill, where there is a dam and bridge. The next is to guard another dam between Wynn’s and Lee’s Mills. (This is the point attacked by General Smith on the 16th ultimo, and where Lieutenant Merrill was wounded. The object of the attack was merely to prevent the further construction of works and feel the strength of the position.) A work, of what extent is not now known, was at the sharp angle of the stream just above Lee’s Mill, and a formidable group of works was at Lee’s Mill, where there was also a dam and bridge. From Lee’s Mill a line of works extends across Mulberry Island, or is supposed to do so. At Southall’s Landing is another formidable group of works, and from here, too, they extend apparently across to the James River. These groups of field works were connected by rifle trenches or parapets for nearly the whole distance. They are far more extensive than may be supposed from the mention of them I make, and every kind of obstruction which the country affords, such as abatis, marsh, inundation, &c., was skillfully used. The line is certainly one of the most extensive known to modern times.

The country on both sides of the Warwick, from near Yorktown down, is a dense forest, with few clearings. It was swampy, and the roads impassable during the heavy rains we have constantly had, except where our own labors had corduroyed them.

If we could have broken the enemy’s line across the isthmus we could have invested Yorktown, and it must, with its garrison, have soon fallen into our hands. It was not deemed practicable, considering the strength of that line and the difficulty of handing our forces (owing to the impracticable character of the country), to do so.

If we could take Yorktown or drive the enemy out of that place the enemy’s line was no longer tenable. This we could do by siege operations. It was deemed too hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place by assault.

The plan of the approaches and their defenses, as determined upon and finally executed, is exhibited on the accompanying map. It was, in words, to open the first parallel as near as possible to the works of the enemy, arid under its protection to establish almost simultaneously batteries along the whole front, extending from York River on the right to the Warwick on the left, a chord of about 1 mile in length. The principal approaches were directed against the east end of the main work, which was most heavily armed, and bore both on the water and land, and lay between Wormley’s Creek and York River. There also, were placed the most of the batteries designed to act against the land front, to enfilade the water batteries and to act upon Gloucester.