official Records of the Rebellion

There were at Fort Monroe and in its vicinity on the 3d ready to move, two divisions of the Third Corps, two divisions of the Fourth Corps, and one division of the Second Corps, and Sykes’ brigade of regular infantry, together with Hunt’s artillery reserve and the regiments of cavalry before named—in all about 58,000 men and 100 guns, besides the division artillery.

Richardson’s and Hooker’s divisions of the Second and Third Corps had not arrived, and Casey’s division of the Fourth Corps was unable to move for want of wagons.
Before I left Washington an order had been issued by the War Department placing Fort Monroe and its dependencies under my control, and authorizing me to draw from the troops under General Wool [p.8] a division of about 10;000 men; which was to be assigned to the First Corps.

During the night of the 3d I received a telegram from the Adjutant-General of the Army stating that- by the President's order I was deprived of all control over General Wool and the troops under his command and forbidden to detach any of his troops without his sanction. This order left me without any base of operations under my own control, and to this day I am ignorant of the causes which led to it.

On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James River was declared by the naval authorities closed to the operations of their vessels by the combined influence of the enemy's batteries on its banks and the Confederate steamers Merrimac, Yorktown, Jamestown, and Teazer. Officer Goldsborough then in command of the United Suites squadron in Hampton Roads, regarded it (and no doubt justly) as his highest and most imperative duty to watch and neutralize the Merrimac, and as he designed using his most powerful vessels in a contest with her, he did not feel able to detach to the assistance of the army a suitable force to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was contrary to what had been previously stated to me and materially affected my plans. At no time during the operations against Yorktown was the Navy prepared to lend us any material assistance in its reduction until after our land batteries had partially silenced the works,

I had hoped, let me say, by rapid movements to drive before me or capture the enemy on the Peninsula, open the James River, and press on to Richmond before he should be materially re-enforced from other portions of his territory. As the narrative proceeds the causes will be developed which frustrated these apparently well-grounded expectations.

I determined then, to move the two divisions of the Fourth Corps by the Newport News and Williamsburg roads to take up a position between Yorktown and Williamsburg while the two divisions of the Third Corps moved direct from Fort Monroe upon Yorktown, the reserves moving so as to support either corps, as might prove necessary* I designed, should the works at. Yorktown and Williamsburg offer a serious resistance, to land the First Corps, re-enforced? if necessary, on the left bank of the York or on the Severn, to move it on Gloucester and West Point, in order to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might have on the Peninsula; and compel him to abandon his positions.

In the commencement of the movement from Fort Monroe -serious difficulties were encountered from the want of precise topographical information as to the country, in advance. Correct local maps were not to be found, and the country, though known in its general features, we found to be inaccurately described in essential particulars in the only maps and geographical memoirs or papers to which access could be had. Erroneous courses to streams and roads were frequently given, and no dependence could be placed on the information thus derived. This difficulty has been found to exist with respect to most portions of the State of Virginia through which my military operations have extended. Reconnaissances, frequently under fire, proved the only trustworthy sources of information, Negroes, however truthful their reports, possessed or were able to communicate very little accurate and no comprehensive topographical information.

[p.9]

On the 3rd the following orders were given for the movement of the 4th:

Porter’s and Hamilton’s divisions and Averell’s cavalry, of the Third Corps, and Sedgwick’s division, of the Second Corps, under Brigadier-General Heintzelman, commanding Third Corps, will move to-morrow in the following order: Porter’s division, with Averell’s cavalry, at 6 a. m., over the New Market and New Bridges to Big Bethel and Howard’s Bridge. This division will send forward to the batteries where the Ship Point road intersects the main Yorktown road a sufficient force to hold that point and cut of the garrison of the Ship Point batteries. The whole division may be used for this purpose if necessary, and if possible the batteries should be occupied by our troops to-morrow. The portion of the division not necessary for this purpose will encamp at Howard’s Bridge.

Hamilton’s division will march at 7 a. M. by the New Bridge road to Big Bethel, and will encamp on Howard’s Creek.

Sedgwick’s division will march at 8 a.m. by the New Market Bridge, taking the direct road to Big Bethel, and will also encamp at Howard’s Bridge.

Brigadier-General Keyes, commanding Fourth Corps, will move with Smith’s and Couch’s divisions at 6 a. m. (Smith’s division in advance) by the James River road. The Fifth Regular Cavalry, temporarily assigned to this corps, will move with Smith’s division, which will encamp at Young’s Mill, throwing forward at least one brigade to the road from Big Bethel to Warwick. Couch’s division will encamp at Fisher’s Creek.

The reserve cavalry, artillery, and infantry will move at 8.30 a. m. by the New Market Bridge to Big Bethel, where it will encamp. On the march it will keep in rear of Sedgwick’s division.

The following is an extract from the order issued on the 4th for the march of the 5th:

The following movements of the army will be carried out to-morrow (5th):

General Keyes will move forward Smith’s division at 6 a.m., via Warwick CourtHouse and the road leading near the old ship-yard, to the “Half-way House,” on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road.

General Couch’s division will march at 6 a. m. to close up on General Smith’s division at the “Half-way House.”

General Keyes’ command will occupy and hold the narrow dividing ridge near the “Half-way House,” so as to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown by land and prevent re-enforcements being thrown in.

General Heintzelman will move forward General Porter’s two rear brigades at 6 a. m. upon the advance guard, when the entire division will advance to a point about 2 miles from Yorktown, where the road turns abruptly to the north and where a road comes in from Warwick Court-House.

General Hamilton’s division will move at 6 a. m., and follow General Porter’s division, camping as near it as possible.

General Sedgwick’s division will march at 5 a. m. as far as the Warwick road, which enters the main Yorktown road near Dr. Powers’ house, and will await further orders.

The reserve will march at 6 a. m. upon the main Yorktown road, halting for further orders at Dr. Powers’ house, the infantry leading, the artillery following next, and the cavalry in rear.

General Sedgwick’s division will for the present act with the reserve, and he will receive orders from headquarters.

In giving these orders of march for the 4th and 5th it was expected that there would be no serious opposition at Big Bethel, and that the advance of the Third Corps beyond that point would force the enemy to evacuate the works at Young’s Mill, while our possession of the latter would make it necessary for him to abandon those at Howard’s Bridge, and the advance thence on Yorktown would place Ship Point in our possession, together with its garrison, unless they abandoned it promptly. The result answered the expectation.

During the afternoon of the 4th General Keyes obtained information of the presence of some 5,000 to 8,000 of the enemy in a strong position at Lee’s Mill. The nature of that position in relation to the Warwick not being at that time understood, I instructed General Keyes to attack and carry this position upon coming in front of it.