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The siege of Khartoum and the British expedition sent to raise the siege and save General Gordon was one of the most famous British military failures of the Victorian period, immortalised at the time by a famous painting showing a romanticised and false view of Gordon's last moments and since by a major movie. The relief expedition was led by Sir Garnet Wolseley, who until then had been one of Victoria's most successful generals, and who had been responsible for the quick conquest of Egypt only a few years earlier.
Snook focuses on the key final phase of the relief expedition - the attempt to get a sizable relief force across the northern Sudan to Khartoum, and in particular the adventures of the Desert Column, the part of Wolseley's army that got closest to Khartoum after a hard-fought advance across the desert, cutting off the 'Great Bend' of the Nile. This was also the most controversial aspect of the campaign. The Desert Column managed to reach the Nile some way to the north of Khartoum and met up with Gordon's steamers, still operating on the river. Two of these steamers were able to make a dash up to Khartoum, arriving two days after the city had fallen and Gordon been killed. In no way could this count as a 'relief' of the city, and both steamers were sunk on the way back down stream (the crews escaping), but it later became part of Wolseley's defence of his plan - the idea that he had only been two day's late was far more palatable that the truth, which was that his main army was still a couple of months away.
Although the Desert Column failed to save Gordon, that hadn't actually been its mission. Wolseley had sent it across the desert to open communications with Khartoum and then report back. The column had fought its way across the desert, fighting two battles against much larger forces, including one in which a corner of a marching square was broken. The original commander had been mortally wounded and his successor, Sir Charles Wilson, had then led a daring dash up-river in two steamboats to try and reach Gordon, only to find that the city had fallen. These adventures along should have won him great renown, but instead Wolseley attempted to pass the blame for the failure of the entire expedition onto Wilson.
The author shows an excellent knowledge of the surviving sources. These are almost entirely from the British side as very few Arab sources have survived, but he does a good job of attempting to reconstruct Mahdist plans and structures from their actions in the battles.
This book is unusual in that the author tells us a large part of his conclusions in the introduction, namely that Wolseley was largely to blame for the failure of the expedition, partly because he insisted on an unrealistic plan of campaign and partly because he then stuck to his original plan until it was too late to change it. The author had spent years researching this campaign in great detail, giving him plenty of time to come to well informed conclusions, but it does come as something of a surprise to find them expressed so soon.
There are one or two areas where I don't entirely agree with the author. One of his sources is Wolseley's private journal, where he expressed very strong views, mainly hostile, about his political superiors and military colleagues. He wouldn't be the first general to use his diary to vent his frustrations rather than to express his real considered views, but the author takes these views quite seriously. One of his key arguments is that Wolseley failed to understand how important time was, but I think that he overplays how early in the campaign it became clear that the siege of Khartoum was a real threat. Early on the Mahdi imposed a lose blockade at best, and Gordon had control of the Nile, outlying forts and even a raiding force of his own. The siege became more serious after Wolseley was already in the field. The author is also perhaps a little over-fond of one of the alternative lines of approach to Khartoum, across the desert from the Red Sea coast. Finally he focuses so heavily on the actions of the Desert Column that we get very little info on what was happening in Khartoum.
The author does make a convincing case that Wolseley was largely to blame for the failure of the expedition. His campaign was built around two novel expedients - the first was the production of a massive fleet of small whaling boats which he used to move supplies and troops up the Nile. In the end the river borne part of the expedition was too slow and played no part in the final part of the campaign. The second was the formation of a force of camel-mounted infantry. This was the force that carried out the desert 'dash', but it is clear that this would have been more effective if the infantry had dismounted and their camels been used for extra baggage. Despite the slow progress of the campaign, at one point Wolseley almost made the right decision, coming close to dispatching a column across the desert a month earlier than he eventually did, but he changed his mind, dooming Gordon.
Knoot doesn't place the entire blame on Wolseley, nor does his suggest that everything Wolseley did was wrong. There is an excellent conclusion in which he looks at the strategic, operational and tactical elements of the campaign and attempts to allocate responsibility for the failure to save Gordon. Here Gladstone takes some of the blame, Wolseley is seen as generally blame-free during the strategic phase of planning, and the original commander of the Desert Column gets much of the tactical blame (shared with the difficulties of crossing the Sudan).
This book is a very impressive achievement, giving us a hugely detailed picture of one of the Victorian army's most difficult campaigns. Although the author has strong views, he presents his material in so much detail that we have plenty of material to use to come to our own conclusions and to judge the quality of his arguments (generally strong).
Chapters
1 - All Men Worship the Rising Sun - Strategic and Political Background to the Nile Campaign
2 - Quandary - Gordon at Khartoum - February-April 1884
3 - Novel Expedients - Wolseley's Plan of Campaign
4 - Delays and Decisions - Prosecuting the Campaign: November-December 1884
5 - Leap in the Dark - The March of the Desert Column
6 - Go Strong into the Desert - Composition, Organization and Capability of Stewart's Force
7 - Approach to Battle - Jakdul Wells to Abu Klea: 14-16 January 1885
8 - Under Fire - The Battle of Abu Klea: Phase I - On the Defensive
9 - The Valley of the Shadow - The Battle of Abu Klea: Phase II - The British Advance
10 - England's Far and Honour a Name - The Battle of Abu Klea: Phase III - The Climax
11 - Walking Amongst Vipers - Abu Klea: The Aftermath
12 - Endless Confusion - The Night March of 18/19 January
13 - The Fight to the Nile - The Battle of Abu Kru: 19 January 1885
14 - The Fort of the Infidels - Gubat and Metemmeh: 20 -23 January 1885
15 - Boy's Own - The River Dash: 24 January-4 February 1885
16 - Too Late: Lies, Myth and Reality - Analysis and Conclusions
Author: Colonel Mike Snook
Edition: Hardcover
Pages: 609
Publisher: Pen & Sword
Year: 2013