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The long siege of Corregidor early in 1942 was one of the early epic struggles of the Pacific War, famous for the eventual surrender of the defenders after a long wait for help that never came. In 1945 the Americans turned the tables on the Japanese, and recaptured the island in a relatively brief campaign.
We get a brief look at the US defences of Corregidor and the 1942 Japanese siege, but as the US forces destroyed all of the existing guns before surrendering they aren’t examined in any details. The Japanese occupied the island and its three neighbours but didn’t start to fortify them until September 1944, when it was clear that the Philippines were at risk. The Japanese had a different aim to the Americans – the US defences were designed to protect Manila Bay against major warships. The Japanese defences were designed to protect the islands themselves and to sink unarmoured cargo ships.
When we look at the officers involved we see competent experienced men on both sides. However the entire campaign only happened because Rear Admiral Sanki Iwabuchi decided to ignore his orders to withdraw to northern Luzon and instead defend Manila, something one can only really imagine happening in the Japanese armed forces at this point. Perhaps the only weak link in the senior officers on either side was Captain Akiri Itagaki, the Japanese commander on the islands, but only because he was a staff officer rather than an experienced combat officer – the Japanese were too short of good experienced officers to place one on Corregidor.
The two sides commited very different types of troops to this battle. On the US side the capture of Corregidor was a high priority, as the US had big plans for Manila Bay. As a result highly experienced high quality units were chosen for the attack. The Americans were also able to commit powerful air and naval forces to the operation. On the Japanese side the garrison had only arrived a few months before the attack and was made up of second line solders, sailors who had lost their warships and other available men. They were supported by a larger number of construction workers and around 1,500 naval personnel operating the suicide boats, patrol and torpedo boats based on the island. In total the Japanese had just over 5,000 men on the island, but they were poorly organised and had little chance to train together.
The planning chapter demonstrates the biggest difference between the two sides. The Japanese, with their thrown-together units and inexperienced commander, came up with a single plan, to defend against an amphibious landing at the most obvious position. The Japanese commander was aware that his inexperienced men could probably only cope with a simple plan, so planned for a largely static defence using the fortifications of the island.
The big problem for the Japanese was that the Americans knew that an amphibious landing was the most obvious approach to take, and so decided to try something else. Paratroops would land on the high ground of Corregidor, and pin down most Japanese defenders and prevent the heavy gun crews getting to their weapons. At the same time there would be an amphibious landing, which would benefit from the distraction caused by the paratroops to get on shore and then fight their way up to the high ground.
The initial landings were very carefully planned. We get good details of the unusual flight plan for the paratroop drop, which would see each aircraft flying several circuits over the small drop zones, each time only dropping 6-8 men instead of the normal 21. This was done in an attempt to get as many paratroops as possible onto the two small drop zones, a parade ground and a golf course. The amphibious landings would follow two hours later, and would hit the low middle of the island, cutting the Japanese defenders in half. Although the Japanese had considered the possibility of a paratroop attack, they got the potential location wrong.
The battle was effectively decided by the success of the paratroops. The unusual drop plan had an extra benefit – when it was clear that the first wave were being blown past the landing zone the drop directors were able to alter the timing to make sure most men from each aircraft hit the right place. However the biggest success came from the men who landed in the wrong place, who ended up attacking and killing the Japanese commander and his entire command staff. The main Japanese command centre also fell very quickly, so the defenders lost their commander and their communications. The amphibious landing benefited greatly from this, as it appears that many of the Japanese were waiting for an order to open fire that never came!
The American success on the first day effectively sealed the fate of the Japanese garrison. Many of the surviving troops were trapped in the tunnels, manning fortifications that were facing away from the Americans. By early 1945 the Americans had worked out effective tactics for dealing with Japanese tunnel defences, using flame throwers, napalm and demolition charges. Because they were often effectively attacking these positions from the rear the Japanese positions weren’t able to support each other in the way they were on other islands.
The campaign ended as a clear failure for the Japanese. They had hoped to inflict more casualties on the Americans than they had suffered themselves in 1942, but instead only inflicted half as many. As we see here it was the unorthodox American plan that won them the battle
We finish with a look at the battles for the other three islands in the entrance to Manila Bay, where more unorthodox plans were used, including flooding the defensive tunnels with fuel and then igniting it.
This is a good account of this campaign, showing out the unorthodox US plan combined with the lucky killing of the Japanese commander right at the start led to a rapid American success.
Chapters
Origins of the Campaign
Chronology
Opposing Commanders
Opposing Forces
Opposing Plans
The Campaign
Aftermath
Author: Mark Lardas
Edition: Paperback
Pages: 96
Publisher: Osprey
Year: 2023