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At the start of 1945 the bulk of the Luftwaffe was facing the Western Allies, but in January 1945 the Soviets smashed the German lines on the Vistula, and began to advance west, threatening Berlin. In response the Germans rushed most Luftwaffe aircraft east, so the last major air battles of the Second World War in Europe would take place on the Eastern Front. This book looks at those campaigns, which saw the Soviet Air Force on the offensive
When we look at the details of the fighting the Soviet advantage in numbers becomes very clear. On a poor day the Soviets flew twice as many sorties as the Germans, at their best that could rise to a ratio of 10-to-1. At the same time the quality of Soviet aircraft and airmen had vastly improved since the dark days of 1941. On the German side the Bf 109 was still one of the mainstays of the fighter force, but was well past its peak, with the same small airframe that had made it so effective early in the war now limiting its potential, while the new revolutionary jet aircraft were unreliable and only present in tiny numbers. Fuel was short, and heavy losses meant that the majority of German pilots were inexperienced novices, with very limited training.
Despite all of these problems, remarkably the Germans did manage to gain temporary air supremacy over the Oder front for a period in February. The author shows that this was mainly due to the rapid nature of the Soviet advance in January – the Germans had been forced back so far they were now operating from their peacetime airfields in Germany, with good all weather facilities, while the Soviets were struggling to operate from muddy fields, while their supply columns lagged behind. However this was only ever going to be a temporary state of affairs, and it came at the expense of operations against the Western Allies, leaving the RAF and USAAF almost unopposed, at least in the air (1945 even saw Bomber Command return to day operations).
The account of the campaign does a good job of linking the fighting in the air to events on the ground. The Soviets were sometimes able to succeed even when their aircraft were grounded by poor weather (most notably at the very start of the offensive in January), but when control of the air was lost the Germans were able to stop the Soviets at the Oder. This played a part in Stalin’s decision to delay the attack on Berlin and instead turn north and south to secure the flanks.
We finish with a look at the battle of Berlin, where the Soviet air offensive was on the same massive scale as tehg round attack. Nearly 7,000 aircraft from three air forces supported the three fronts involved in the battle, while the Germans were only able to gather 1,524 operational aircraft. Despite its fame the resulting battle wasn’t one of the great city battles of the war – the German defense of Berlin was somewhat lacklustre – the Soviet offensive began on 16 April, Berlin was surrounded on 25 April and surrendered on 2 May, one of the shorter city battles on the Eastern Front. During this short period the Soviets flew nearly 90,000 sorties, a very impressive record.
This is a very valuable book, covering a topic that is rarely covered in any detail in western histories. The Luftwaffe side of the story is sometimes dealt with, but most English language accounts of the fighting in 1945 focus on the experience of the RAF and USAAF, facing a handful of units that remained in the west. This look at the much larger air battles on the Eastern Front is a good balance to that.
Chapters
Introduction
Chronology
Attacker’s Capabilities
Defender’s Capabilities
Campaign Objectives
The Campaign
Aftermath and Analysis
Author: William E. Hiestand
Edition: Paperback
Pages: 96
Publisher: Osprey
Year: 2024