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The battle of Varese (26 May 1859) was Garibaldi’s first success during his Alpine campaign of 1859 and saw his volunteers repulse an Austrian force that attempted to push him out of Varese.
Garibaldi had already established his reputation as an Italian patriot and military leader in the aftermath of the First Italian War of Independence, when he had taken part in the defence of Rome. In December 1858, as part of his preparations for the looming Second War of Italian Independence, Cavour summoned Garibaldi to a private meeting. Cavour had already arranged a defensive alliance with the France of Napoleon III, and all he needed now was to provoke an Austrian attack. Cavour and Garibaldi met on 20 December 1858, when Garibaldi was offered command of a volunteer force (which he would have to raise himself). He may also have been given a role in a soon to be abandoned plot to use a revolt in Carrara as the trigger for war.
The two men met again on 2 March 1859. Cavour’s plan had now changed, and Garibaldi was offered command of a force that would consist of volunteers who had escaped into Piedmont from Austrian controlled Lombardy. The mere existence of this force would antagonise Austria, while its deployment in a secondary theatre would force the Austrians to disperse their troops when war came. Cavour’s plotting met with success. In April 1859 the Austrians issued an ultimatum, demanding that Piedmont totally demobilise her army and withdraw all troops from the Lombard border. Piedmont rejected this ultimatum, and war was declared on 27 April 1859.
For the next few weeks the Piedmontese were in a vulnerable position, outnumbered by the Austrian army already in northern Italy while they waited for their French allies to arrive. Garibaldi’s men spent the first three weeks of the war operating as part of the main Piedmontese army, which took up a defensive position near the Po.
Once enough French troops had arrived to secure the Allies position Garibaldi was released to carry out an independent attack on the Austrian right flank in the Alps. His force now consisted of 3,000 volunteers, many from Lombardy but with a group of experienced leaders who had fought with Garibaldi before. His troops were poorly armed, with obsolete muskets, and lacked artillery and cavalry, but they did know the areas they would be fighting in.
Garibaldi’s first task was to cross the Ticino River, which flowed out of Lake Maggiore and formed the border between Piedmont and Austrian Lombardy. The Austrians had steam boats on Lake Maggiore, a battalion of infantry to watch the river, and had attempted to seize every boat on the lake and the river to prevent the Italians from crossing over. Garibaldi’s local knowledge now came to his rescue – the leader of his scouts was a local landowner and was able to gather a collection of barges, which were hidden at Castelletto, three miles below the lake. Garibaldi tricked the Austrians into believing he intended to march north along the western shore of the lake, before on the night on 22-23 May he turned south, crossed the river at Castelletto and advanced to Varese. That city rebelled against the Austrians just before Garibaldi arrived late on 23 May. News of Garibaldi’s arrival triggered revolts all across the area, but he still had to face the Austrian reaction.
The Austrian high command was alarmed by these developments, which threatened their right flank. General Karl von Urban, with the brigade Rupprecht, was sent to drive Garibaldi out of Varese. Urban had around 3,000 infantry, supported by the normal complement of artillery and cavalry, so in theory he outnumbered Garibaldi. Part of the Austrian army was never engaged, so the two sides were probably about equal in size (Garibaldi may even have had a slight advantage in numbers, although not in equipment).
Garibaldi spent 24-25 May strengthening his position. Outposts were placed at the Belforte farm, in the direction the enemy was expected to attack from. Part of Garibaldi’s force was posted in the suburb of Lower Biumo, to the north-east of the city, while Garibaldi commanded the reserve at Upper Biumo, a little further to the north.
Urban advanced towards Varese from the east (along the road from Como). He detached one column to his right, with orders to attack from the north (this news reached Garibaldi, and was the reason he was at Upper Biumo). This column didn’t reach Varese, giving Urban around 2,000 men.
The battle started early on 26 May when the Austrians pushed back Garibaldi’s outposts. Their artillery opened fire on the Italian troops at Lower Biumo, but they were protected by some trenches and the bombardment did little damage. The Austrians advanced towards the Italian lines, but were repulsed by a bayonet charge. The Austrian artillery retired after this first engagement.
It was now mid-morning and it was clear that the Austrian flanking column was not going to appear. Garibaldi decided to launch a counterattack, using his troops on the Upper Biumo to attack the Austrian right and troops posted further south to attack their left. The Austrians were forced into a slow fighting retreat, and held together for a mile until they reached the Belforte farm. An attempt to hold on there failed and the retreat sped up. Only a lack of cavalry on Garibaldi’s side prevented the retreat from turning into a rout. Garibaldi did follow up with some of his infantry, but ran into the Austrian rearguard at a village normally identified at Malnate. The Austrians were eventually outflanked, but this gave their main force time to withdraw. By noon Garibaldi had returned to Varese, having won the first victory of his campaign.
Although many aspects of this war feel remarkably Napoleonic, in other ways the world was changing. That evening Urban was able to send a telegraph to Austrian headquarters, informing them that he had been defeated by 7,000 men. The Austrians gave Urban command of two more brigades (Augustin and Schaffgotsche), and all four battalions of the brigade Augustin were transferred by train from Milan to Como by the early afternoon of 27 May, a speed of movement that the Napoleonic Austrians would have envied but rarely achieved.
This rapid deployment would be in vain. On the following day Garibaldi defeated Urban at the battle of San Fermo (27 May 1859), and they were forced to abandon Como.
The Second War of Italian Unification 1859-61, Frederick C. Schneid. Focuses on the three separate conflicts that made up the Second War of Italian Unification (the Franco-Austrian War, Garibaldi's invasion of the kingdom of Naples and the invasion of the Papal State), the conflict that saw the creation of the Kingdom of Italy. [read full review]
