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The battle of Mukden was the largest and final major land battle of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and at the time was the largest modern land battle ever fought. The Japanese victory saw their prestige rise greatly, and also saw them establish a presence on the Chinese mainland, the start of the process that would eventually lead to the costly Japanese invasions of China. On the Russia side the defeat led to revolution, and limited reform within the Empire.
We start with a brief history of Russia and Japan’s rival ambitious to secure dominance over Manchuria. Russia took an early lead, and by 1904 were close to completing a key rail link. It was this that triggered the Japanese decision to go to war, in an attempt to gain control over the area before the Russians were too strong.
The campaign itself started with a surprise attack by the Japanese and a series of victories that saw them besiege Port Arthur, the Russian foothold on the Chinese coast. The Russians then slowly moved more troops to the Far East, gathering a strong army to the north of Port Arthur.
After a brief section on the fighting around Port Arthur we move onto the battles deeper into Manchuria. The large scale fighting here began with a sizable but ineffective Russian cavalry raid. Even after this, it was the Russians who went onto the offensive, resulting in the battle of San-de-pu. Here we see the deficiencies in the Russian army. The Russian plan was sound, if rather conservative, and resulted in them having a massive numerical advantage at the point of attack, but they still proved to be less effective than their Japanese opponents. Progress was slow, and casualties high, and the Russians failed to use their numerical advantage well. As a result the battle ended as a costly failure.
Next comes a look at the rival commanders. Despite their eventual defeat, the Russians actually had a highly regarded leader in General Kuropatkin. His subordinates were generally compentant, but not outstand. Ironically the one who emerged with the most credit was General Rennenkampf, more famous for his disasterous defeat early in the First World War.
On the Japanese side the senior commanders had lived through a remarkable period of modernisation. Some had been born into samurai families before the Meiji restoration, and had fought in the wars to overthrow the shogun. However they adapted brilliantly to the new world they found themselves in, and by 1905 had several decades of experience in the modern post restoration Japanese army.
The section on the rival armies shows that they had both undergone major reforms. On the Russian side they had switched from a fully regular army to a mix of a large regular army and massive reserve, although it would take a long time to get the reservists into action. This meant Russia eventually a larger army, but many of their men had families, who would be directly affected by the defeat, probably helping to trigger the post-war revolutions.
On the Japanese side the biggest change was scale. In the decade since they had defeated the Chinese in Korea they had massively expanded their army, and would prove able to deploy nearly 700,000 men to Manchuria. This was a far bigger army than the Russian had been expected,
The biggest failing on the Russian side emerges in the section on the rival plans. In the immediate aftermath of the battle of San-de-pu the Russians still had a sizable numerical advantage. Once it became clear the Japanese weren’t going to attack immediately, the Russians began to prepare for their own offensive, but the planning proceeded so slowly that the Japanese were able move troops up from Port Arthur, which had now surrendered, and carry out their own offensive.
On the Japanese side planning proceeded more quickly. General Oyama planned to carry out a diversionary attack on one flank to draw the Russians out of position, then make his main attack on the opposite flank. A great deal of effort went into preparing for this, from how the armies were organised to the relative lack of defensive structures on the flanks (to allow the Japanese attack to start more quickly).
The account of the battle shows that the Russians were dogged defenders, but poor attackers. They were able to hold off an aggressive Japanese attack for some time, before their lines were finally penetrated in some places. Even then they were able to conduct a succesful retreat, up a single railway line, between two converging Japanese forces.
Although Mukden was a clear Japanese victory, it wasn’t the crushing victory that they had wanted. We see many of the problems soon to be faced on the Western Front – both armies occupied fronts stretching along many miles, so it was hard for any individual success to have a major impact on the overall battle. Instead it would take a process of slow attrition to create gaps in the Russian line. Here there were still flanks to be exploited, but even that wasn’t easy, as the Russians were able to create a new, westwards facing front, to face the Japanese trying to outflank them.
This is a good account of this significant battle, giving us a good idea of how the Japanese managed to defeat a larger army in a strong defensive position, but also how difficult it was to win a truly crushing victory with the armies of 1905.
Chapters
Origins of the Campaign
Chronology
Opposing Commanders
Opposing Forces
Opposing Plans
The Campaign
Aftermath
Author: John Valitutto
Edition: Paperback
Pages: 96
Publisher: Osprey
Year: 2025