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This book follows on from one looking at the Combined Fleet from Pearl Harbor to Midway. We thus start here with the Japanese reeling from the loss of four of their six carriers at Midway, and caught out by the American landings on Guadalcanal.
We start with an overview of the naval campaign around Guadalcanal, which saw some of the most intense periods of conflict of the war, and the wider Solomons campaign, including the battles around Bougainville.
We then move on to a look at the actual strength of the Japanese fleet during this period. We see that at the start of the period the Japanese either equalled or outnumbered the Americans in each category of ship, although the author does split the four official fleet carriers into the true fleet carriers of the Shokaku class and the large conversions of the Junyo class. The detailed look at the fleet type by type reveals that the Japanese tended not to commit their best and heaviest warships to the fighting in the Solomons, instead relying very heavily on their destroyer and cruiser forces. As a result they suffered very heavy losses of destroyers. Throught this campaign the massive battleships Yamato and Musashi were based at Truk, but neither played any part in the fighting, where their presence would probably have swung things towards the Japanese.
The technical session is wide ranging, looking at both the technical aspects of Japanese guns and how effective their long range gunnery actually was, their relatively poor anti-aircraft armament, and the world beating Type 93 torpedo. Here we get an explanation of why it was so good – range, lack of wake and huge warhead. Japanese naval air power is examined, as is the organisation of the fleet. The doctrine of the ‘decisive battle’ is examined, including which elements of it ende dup being used and which didn’t (long range gun battles being one part that didn’t work out, good night fighting skills being part that did). Intelligence emerges as a key weakness, mainly because it wasn’t taken seriously by the Japanese Navy. Base development was also poor, with Truk lacking adequate fuel storage facilities despite having been a Japanese base since 1914. They had also failed to develop the naval facilities at Rabaul with enough urgency, so any major fleet operation in the Solomons needed to start at Truk, with a greatly increased cost in scare fuel.
The combat chapter includes both a general overview of the campaign, and a more detailed examination of some of the battles, including the Naval battle of Guadalcanal, notable for the first direct clash between battleships in the Pacific.
The analysis of the campaign shows that the eventual Japanese failure in the Solomons was mainly down to their reluctance to commit fully to the fight. The two largest battleships ever built simply watched it all from Truk, at a period on the war when the Americans would have struggled to cope with them. There is one typo – here – what follows makes it clear that ‘Still, the Combined fleet did make the most of its window of opportunity’ should clearly read ‘didn’t’. This was the period in which Japanese naval aviation was worn down beyond repair, leading to a surprisingly long gap between carrier battles. This was also the period where the Japanese advantage in night battles was eroded. Without the ‘Long Lance’ torpedo this campaign would probably have been disasterous for the Japanese.
Chapters
The Fleet’s Purpose
Fleet Fighting Power
How the Fleet Operated
Combat and Analysis
Author: Mark Stille
Edition: Paperback
Pages:
Publisher: Osprey
Year: 2025