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The Japanese raid into the Indian Ocean in 1942 was the last success for their experienced carrier fleet before the disaster at Midway, and at least briefly gave them the chance to occupy Ceylon if they had desired.
The Japanese fleet for the Indian Ocean raid contained five of their six fleet carriers, the second largest deployment after the attack on Pearl Harbor (Kaga was only missing because she was being repaired after hitting a rock). However even this early the Japanese were starting to suffer from a lack of replacement aircrews, and the five carriers only carried 275 aircraft – at full strength their air groups would have contained just over 300 aircraft. Even so this was a powerful fleet, with five of the best carriers in the world, carrying some of the best naval aircraft of the period, and flown by some of the best trained and most experienced naval aviators – the elite ‘Sea Eagles’ whose loss over the next few years would cripple Japanese naval air power. Their only weakness was in scouting, with no radar and only relatively short range float planes carried on the capital ships to scout for the fleet.
When we move onto the British side we get a very different picture. The Royal Navy had been starved of new construction in the inter-war period, and the new ships that were being built were needed in European waters and the Atlantic. Numerically the Eastern Fleet looked quite impressive, with five battleships and three carriers, but it had fewer than 100 carrier aircraft, and at this stage in the war they were outclassed by their Japanese opponents. The five battleships were all First World War veterans – Warspite and four Royal Soveriegn class ships. Its best two ships were the fleet carriers Formidable and Indomitable, but they were let down by their aircraft. One advantage the British did have was radar.
When we look at the opposing plans we see another British problem. The Japanese had a simple plan for the raid – two main targets in the two Royal Navy bases they knew about on Ceylon – combined with strikes along the east coast of India. In contrast Admiral Somerville came up with a very dangerous plan based on a series of incorrect assumptions. He assumed the Japanese were only bringing two carriers, would attack both targets at once and at night. In addition British intelligence had picked up the original 1 April date for the attack but not the delays that pushed it back a few days. If the Japanese had attacked on 1 April then Somerville’s fleet would have been in a very dangerous position and quite probably destroyed. The Japanese delay meant that this danger was avoided, but Somerville then made a mistake that cost him several ships. Instead of considering that the raid might be delayed he decided it had been cancelled and sent several ships back to Ceylon to be overhauls. As a result the cruisers Cornwall and Dorsetshire and old carrier Hermes were all sunk. Once the Japanese were detected Somerville attempted to incept them and the two fleets were only 100nm apart when he finally realised how strong they were and retired.
We get a good account of both sides of this naval campaign, in which both sides managed to narrowly miss their opponents, and neither got to carry out the attack on the enemy fleet they were hoping for.
We finish with a comparison between the raid into the Indian Ocean and the attack on Midway, showing that many of the mistakes that caused disaster at Midway were also present in the Indian Ocean.
Chapters
Origins of the Campaign
Chronology
Opposing Commanders
Opposing Forces
Opposing Plans
The Campaign
Aftermath
Author: Mark Stille
Edition: Paperback
Pages: 96
Publisher: Osprey
Year: 2023