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The battle of Arras was the one major British offensive during the 1940, and saw two tank regiments attack around Arras, in theory supported by infantry. In reality the infantry wasn’t ready in time, so the tanks attacked by themselves, had some initial successes but were eventually forced to retreat after the Germans recovered from the initial shock of the attack.
Despite the title, the author’s main argument is that the fighting around Arras wasn’t actually a counterattack, but was instead only an attempt to get into position for the actual counterattack, which was to take place on the following day, to coincide with a French attack from the south. This certainly fits with the British orders, which were to reach certain fixed points ready for the next day’s attack to begin. The early stages of the fighting show that the British had little idea what they would run into south of Arras, and certainly weren’t expecting to find Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division.
On the German side the operation was clearly seen as the start of a counterattack, mainly because that was exactly what many in the German high command feared would happen. The famous ‘sickle cut’ attack that split the Allied armes in half had one potential weakness, as the fast moving panzer divisions got ahead of their infantry support, creating a narrow German held corridor between the French in the south and the French, British and Belgians in the north. A well coordinated large scale Allied attack from both sides of this corridor could have caused great problems for the Germans, restoring the connection between the Allied armies and cutting off the German armoured spearhead. In reality the Germans were moving too quickly for the Allies to cope with, and the chance for that sort of counterattack quickly passed.
One feature of this battle that is often overlooked is that both sides made the same fundamental mistake of allowing their armour and infantry to become separated. On the British side the problem was that the units involved rarely if ever trained together, so had no experience of combined arms operations. This would remain a problem for the British for most of the war, with plenty of similar examples found in North Africa and even Normandy. On the German side Rommel’s panzers had simply outpaced their own infantry. Both sides found the same result – isolated infantry struggled to cope with enemy tanks, but isolated tanks struggled to take full advantage of their successes. The British infantry fought their own battle, mopping up behind the armour,
The author has produced a very detailed account of this battle, which allows him to deal with some of the myths that have come to surround it. This includes the balance of power between the two tank forces – many accounts focus on the Matilda Mk II, which had thick enough armour to resist most German tank guns and their standard 37mm anti-tank gun, and enough firepower to take out most German tanks. However they were only present in fairly small numbers, with the bulk of the force made up of the much lighter Matilda Mk I and light tanks. The Matilda I was a two man tank armed with machine guns, and was not capable of taking on enemy tanks.
The author takes the story on beyond the end of the attack at Arras, to look at the fate of the units left around the city. They were soon in danger of being cut off by the rapidly advancing Germans, and a series of battles followed as the British attempted to set up a new defensive line and the Germans threatened to break through it. These battles distracted the Germans, and although this line was soon abandoned, the time gained here did allow a strong defense of the Dunkirk perimeter to be set up, without which the evacuation couldn’t have happened.
Slightly oddly the analysis of this battle, which for me belongs in the conclusion, gets placed in an appendix, where it could easily be missed. The scope of analysis goes beyond the details of the fighting at Arras to look at the systematic failures of the BEF in 1940, from poor communications to the inability of armour, artillery and infantry to work together properly.
This is a good account of the only major British offensive of the campaign of 1940, looking at the reasons for its failure as well as tracing the course of events in some detail.
Chapters
1 – Between the Wars
2 – The Development of Fall Gelb
3 – Blitzkrieg
4 – The British Expeditionary Force
5 – Concentration and Orders
6 – March to the Start Line
7 – The Left Column’s Battle
8 – The Right Column’s Battle
9 – The Withdrawal
10 – Aftermath of Battle
11 – The Canal Line
Author: Tim Saunders
Edition: Paperback
Pages: 176
Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
Year: 2017