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The British Grand Fleet was by far the most powerful naval force of the First World War, and played a key (if often unglamorous role) in the Allied victory in the First World War by helping impose the distant naval blockade of Germany, slowly starving the country into surrender.
We start with the launch of HMS Dreadnought, the first all-big gun battleship to be completed, a move that triggered a new naval arms race in which the major naval powers rushed to replace their suddenly obsolete pre-dreadnoughts with similar battleships. However this didn’t start the naval arms race between Britain and Germany – just briefly placed the two powers at an almost level starting point (before British industrial might meant they quickly rebuilt their lead). It is sometimes suggested that building the Dreadnought was a mistake, because it leveled the playing field, but other powers had also had the same idea – in 1904 the Japanese had authorised the Satsuma, which was originally to be armed with twelve 12in guns before some had to be swapped for 10in guns, while USS Michigan (eight 12-in guns) was authorised before Dreadnought had been launched.
Konstam looks at the German plans to deal with the superior power of the Grand Fleet. Before the war they adopted ‘Risk Theory’, an attempt to make a naval war with Germany so costly that it would leave Britain vulnerable to attack by one of the other major naval powers – however in 1914 France, Russia and Japan were all allies of Britain and the United States neutral, leaving Germany with no major naval ally. ‘Risk Theory’ was thus replaced with ‘Force Balancing’, the idea of nibbling away at the Grand Fleet in smaller ambushes, until the two sides were equal in numbers. This replied on the Germans being able to sink British ships quicker than they could be replaced, something they never actually achieved, and without losing major warships of their own. Instead the Grand Fleet’s numerical advantage just kept on increasing. Konstam also looks at Jellicoe’s strategy, which was to focus on the distant blockage of Germany, and only risk battle at the right moment – a plan that greatly frustrated the Germans (and often frustrated the British press and public, who were expected a new Trafalgar).
After this sizable strategic introduction we move onto the fleet itself. We start with a look at the development of the dreadnoughts. When she was launched HMS Dreadnought was revolutionary – fast and heavily armed – but she did have flaws, in particular the layout of guns – four of her eight guns were carried on twin turrets on either side of the superstructure, so only six guns could fire in any single direction. The next dreadnoughts added a second turret forward, so eight of their ten guns could fire on the beam, but the second forward turret was at the same level as the first, so only one of them could fire directly forward. The Orion class finally introduced superfiring turrets – pairs of turrets fore and aft, with the inner one mounted higher than the outer, so they could both fire directly ahead or behind. The peak came with the Queen Elizabeth class, armed with eight 15in guns in four twin turrets, and with another increase in speed – indeed these ships, in a much modified form, were still amongst the best in British service in the Second World War. At Jutland the Royal Naval had six of these 15in battleships alongside the original dreadnoughts.
From battleships we move down to the cruisers, of which the Navy started the war with 120, mainly light or scout types, and the battlecruiser, which combined battleship guns with cruiser speed. This is probably the most controversial British ship design of the First World War – in theory they were powerful enough to destroy anything faster than them, and fast enough to escape anything more powerful than them, but the temptation to use them as part of the battlefleet was too tempting, and as a result three were lost at Jutland where they came up against their German equivalents, which carried similar guns but with better armour.
We then move on to the technical factors that helped decide how effective these ships actually were – from their main guns to their gunnery direction equipment, which was remarkably sophisticated, and included range finders and mechanical computers that could combine to predict where a moving ship should be by the time a shell reached it, allowing for centrally controlled gunnery. Armour, engines, mines, torpedoes, U-Boats, naval aviation and wireless are all discussed.
Chapter three looks at one of the most important elements of the fleet – how it was actually organised and commanded. The Grand Fleet was a massive organisation, and controlling it all was a massive job. Konstam goes beyond the normal look at Jellicoe and Beatty to also look at the Admiralty and how it influenced operations – in particular the roles of the First Sea Lord and of naval intelligence. The role of Room 40 and Naval Intelligence in the intercepting and decoding of German radio signals is given due prominence – it was these signals that allowed the Grand Fleet to be based at Scapa Flow but still react to German moves in time.
The scale of the fleet is made clear by the two pages showing the organisation of the Battle Fleet and Battlecruiser Fleet at Jutland, with between them four squadrons of battleships, three of battlecruisers, seven of cruisers and six destroyer flotillas.
The last third of the book looks at the Grand Fleet in action. A key focus here is to dispel the idea that the fleet spent almost all of its time of its time anchored at Scapa Flow. This is quickly disproved – the Grand Fleet was often at sea, especially up to and just after Jutland, although an increase in losses to submarines did reduce the enthusiasm for sorties later in the war (as it did for the Germans, as the British submarine blockade of the Heligoland Bight became a real threat).
We finish with a brief look at how the Grand Fleet became even more powerful after Jutland, as many of the problems revealed earlier in the war were solved. This effectively stopped the German High Seas Fleet from even attempting to trigger a battle. Instead the German fleet was stuck in port, where its men eventually mutinied, starting the collapse of Imperial Germany. The final triumph of the Grand Fleet was the surrender of the High Seas Fleet at the end of the war, one of the most complete examples of a naval victory in all of history.
Chapters
The Fleet’s Purpose
Fleet Fighting Power
How the Fleet Operated
Combat and Analysis
Author: Angus Konstam
Edition: Paperback
Publisher: Osprey