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The invasion of Borneo was the last major Allied offensive in the Pacific, overlapping with the battle of Okinawa at the start but lasting longer, and only ending with the Japanese surrender. It was also the largest Australian led offensive of the Pacific War, and as we see here demonstrated how effective the Australian army was by 1945.
There is a tendancy to see the invasion of Borneo as a wasted effort, largely carried out to satisfy the post-war ambitions of the Australian political leadership, especially as the fighting ended with the overall Japanese surrender. However when the invasion was being planned the Allies were expecting the war in the Pacific to last into 1946, and probably require an expensive invasion of the Japanese Home Islands. In that context Borneo was actually in quite a key position, between the Americans in the Philippines and the planned British return to Malaya and Singapore. It was also a major source of oil for the Japanese, although by the time the invasion was approved the Imperial Japanese Navy had been almost destroyed and getting any fuel to Japan would have been difficult.
That isn’t to say that the political concerns didn’t play a part in this role. We get a good look at the politics begin this here. During the fighting on New Guinea the Australian army had played a major role, but when MacArthur turned his attention to the Philippines they were to be left behind. This didn’t go down well with the Australian leadership, who wanted to ensure they would have a major role in the post-war Pacific. Churchill was also keen to make sure that the British Commonwealth wasn’t left out of the final battles in the Pacific, thus allowing the Americans to take all of the credit for what had been an Allied campaign. Ironically it would be MacArthur’s desire to take direct control in the Philippines that would give the Australians their chance – early in 1945 he split his command in two, taking direct control in the Philippines and leaving the rest to the Australians.
We then move onto a look at Borneo itself. Before the war this vast island was split into four states. The Dutch controlled the largest part of the island, with three smaller British controlled states in the front. These three were somewhat unusual – all were British protectorates, but two – Sarawak and Brunei – also had their own rulers – Charles Brooke in Sarawak and the Sultan of Brunei.
The section on commanders gives too much space to MacArthur, who was officially commander of the entire South West Pacific Area, but wasn’t involved in this battle (other than turning up for a photo op). More important was General Sir Thomas Blamey, head of the Australian Army from 1941 onwards, and General Leslie Morshead, who commanded the main fighting force – Australian I Corps. Morshead was a very experienced commander, having commanded the besieged garrison at Tobruk in 1941, fought at El Alamein and later on New Guinea. Both do get their own section. We also look at his two divisional commanders and the most important of their subordinates.
On the Japanese side we look at Lt Gen Masao Baba, commander of the 37th Army, and thus in charge of the defences of Borneo. However his role was limited by the distance between the three battlefields and the total Allied domination of the seas and air, which prevented him moving troops any significant distances on Borneo. We also get a brief biography of Vice Admiral Michiaki Kamada, who commanded the defences of Balikpapan.
The section on the opposing forces makes it clear just how big an advantage the Australians had. Although the Japanese had about the same number of men on Borneo as were in the two attacking divisions, the Australians were able to concentrate on three locations, while the Japanese were widely scattered. More importantly the Australians were supported by a major commitment of air power and powerful naval forces. There were several Allied air bases within range of Borneo – Morotai was close enough for the short ranged Spitfire to be used alongside a range of longer ranged aircraft. On the Japanese side their only remaining strength was the defensive tenacity of their troops and the strong defences they had built inland.
The original Australian plan called for six landings around the coast of Borneo and nearby islands – codenamed Oboe 1 to Oboe 2. However three of these would only take place after earlier stages had been completed, and two were off Borneo altogether. Only 1, 2 and 6 – Tarakan, Balikpapan and Brunei – would atually be carried out. On the Japanese side the ability to react was limited, but we do see that they had created strong defences inland, and were prepared to fight a guerrilla campaign if needed.
The Campaign chapter looks at each of the three Allied attacks in turn. We start with Tarakan, a hilly island important for its main airfield. This turned into a typical island battle of the later war, with a fairly easy landing followed by the capture of the airfield and town in the first few days, but then by a much longer battle to clear the Japanese out of the hilly, wooded northern part of the island. However the airfield turned out to be disappointing, and by the time is was ready for use the war was almost over.
The second attack was at Brunei, with the aim of securing the oil and rubber resources of the area. The initial landings were totally unopposed and Brunei town was secured with almost no fighting. Some resistance developed later, but the main problem was with the Japanese setting oil wells on firfe before retreating. In contrast nearby Labaun Island was defended, in the same way at Tarakan, so we see the same pattern of easy landing and early advances followed by a bitter battle against the defenders further inland. However here we see the airfields being captured and put into use very quickly.
Finally we move onto Balikpapan, the last major amphibious landing of the war, and the largest Australian landing. Balikpapan was the centre of the oil industry in Dutch Borneo and was the best defended part of Borneo, with around 10,000 Japanese troops of varying quality in the area. Here we get the same almost unopposed landing, and some fighting on the way to the town and airfield, but the Australians stopped after the airfield at Managar was captured on 21 July, thus avoiding the third stage, the bitter fights inland.
This is a well balanced account of this campaign, giving us enough background to understand the overall purpose and shape of it, without getting bogged down too far in very detailed narratives.
Chapters
Chronology
Origins of the Campaign
Opposing Commanders
Opposing Forces
Opposing Plans
The Campaign
Aftermath
Author: Angus Konstam
Edition: Paperback
Pages: 96
Publisher: Osprey
Year: 2024