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After the Soviet counterattacks of November 1942 isolated the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad Hitler refused to allow the besieged army to attempt to break out to safety, and instead ordered them to hold on around Stalingrad until the siege could be broken, while they would be supplied by air. This effort failed badly, leaving the army increasingly short on supplies and unable to hold on until a spring relief effort.
The key moment came right at the start of the siege, when Hitler asked if an airlift was possible, and the Luftwaffe representative at his HQ did his calculations wrong and tentatively stated that it would be, if all went well. However he had miscalculated the carrying capacity of the supply containers, and failed to consult with any of the commanders on the ground, all of whom said that it wouldn’t be possible. Unsurprisingly Hitler was unwilling to listen to anyone who didn’t agree with the original conclusion, and insisted on an airlift (it seems unlikely that he would have acted much differently even if the original conclusion had been that the airlift wasn’t possible).
One good point is made at this stage – Stalingrad is often looked at somewhat in isolation, but the start of Operation Uranus on 19 November 1942 came eleven days after the start of Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of French North Africa, and two weeks after the collapse of the Axis position at El Alamein and the start of Rommel’s retreat back to Tunisia. As a result Germany’s limited number of transport aircraft were split between two entirely separate theatres, with large numbers being used to fly troops into Tunisia to build up the Axis position there. The Tunisian campaign lasted longer than the Soviet siege of Stalingrad, so the Germans were never able to focus entirely on the Stalingrad airlift.
The main thing that emerges here is that the Germans never even got close to success in the airlift. There was only one day where they reached the 300 ton minimum required by the Sixth Army at Stalingrad, and there were plenty of days where they failed to get any supplies to the besieged troops. When we start to look at the airlift in detail it becomes clear just why they were never able to come close to success. The airfields outside the bridgehead were located at the end of a long thin supply line, so the Luftwaffe had to use much of its transport capacity to fly essential supplies into those airfields. The winter weather often made flying very difficult, while the poor conditions on the airfields meant that the serviceability rate of German aircraft was very low. Inside the bridgehead facilities were even more limited, and the arrival of several transport aircraft at once could easily overwhelm them. On the Soviet side time a lot of care had gone into preparing the Soviet Air Force for the battle, and specialist fighter units took a heavy toll of German transport aircraft. Repeated air attacks on German airfields caused a lot of disruption, but an uncertain amount of damage. Close to the city was a band of anti-aircraft guns that also made the trip more dangerous.
This is a useful account of this key part of the battle of Stalingrad, a clear failure that helped doomed the German troops trapped around the city and also played a major role in reducing the reputation of the Luftwaffe and damaging it in Hitler’s eyes.
Chapters
Origins
Chronology
Attacker’s Capabilities
Defender’s Capabilities
Campaign Objectives
The Campaign
Aftermath and Assessment
Author: William E. Hiestand
Edition: Paperback
Pages: 96
Publisher: Osprey
Year: 2023