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The battle of Kursk was the last major German offensive on the Eastern Front, and was stopped by a massive Soviet concentration of forces, allowing them to massively outnumber the attacking Germans in armour. This book looks at the various types of armoured vehicles used by the Soviets at Kursk, and how they performed in the battle itself, both technically and tactically.
We start with a look at how the Soviet armoured forces were organised, and how that had changed between the start of the war and the battle of Kursk. A key thing to remember here is that Soviet formations tended to be smaller than their German name-sakes, so a Soviet armoured corps was roughly equivalent to a German Panzer Division. Soviet doctrine remained inflexible,
Kursk came at a point where the Germans had regained an advantage in armour, after being caught out in 1942 by the T-34. By 1943 they had up-gunned the Panzer IV so it could cope with the T-34, and had plenty of anti-tank guns capable of dealing with the more heavily armoured Soviet tanks. They also had a small number of Tiger Is, and the first of the new Panthers, although they proved to be massively unreliable at this stage. As a result the Soviets were now fighting against equal or superior tanks.
On the Soviet side the most famous tank at Kursk was of course the T-34, but as we see that no longer had the technological edge of the Germans that it started with, and the more advanced T-34/85 had yet to enter service. The KV-1 was effectively obsolete, the Germans now having guns that could penetrate its armour at long range, while it has the same gun as the T-34 and limited mobility. The T-60 and T-70 light tanks were both very vulnerable. We also look at the various self propelled guns – the SU types – which gave the Soviets extra firepower, especially useful in a defensive battle. Finally there is a look at the lend-lease tanks available to the Soviets, which made up about one fifth of the armoured force at Kursk.
We then move onto the battle itself. Here we get to see events from both sides, essential to understand the Soviet performance. Despite all of the effort put into it, the German attack at Kursk made little real progress. In general we see the Germans still had a tactical edge, but they were attacking a much stronger force, well dug in and expecting the attack. Soviet counterattacks could be costly, with some tank armies losing most of their vehicles. In general overall losses are lower than earlier accounts of the battle would suggest – on both sides it is hard to work out exactly how many tanks were lost, and there is a blurred line with vehicles that were repairable, but again there is a general theme – German losses were lower than some early accounts would suggest, while Soviet losses were massive, but as the Soviets ended up in command of the battlefield many of these vehicles were repaired. One key element of this battle is that it shows how important pressure elsewhere was – Hitler didn’t cancel the offensive because he accepted the attack had failed, but instead because he wanted the key SS divisions being held in reserve to move to Italy, where the Allies had just landed on Sicily and the Fascist regime was clearly wobbling.
This is a useful examination of the role of Soviet armour at Kursk, where despite being technically and tactically outclassed by the German armour the Soviets were able to take advantage of their defensive preparations and superior numbers to defeat the last major German offensive in the east, preparing the way for the two years of constant Soviet offensives.
Chapters
Introduction
Organization and Doctrine
Technical Factors
The Campaign
Aftermath
Author: William E. Hiestand
Edition: Paperback
Pages: 48
Publisher: Osprey
Year: 2024