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Operation Steinbock was the Luftwaffe’s last attempt to carry out a major bombing campaign over Britain using conventional aircraft. It was launched in response to a direct order from Hitler, as an attempt to get revenge for the increasingly powerful Allied attacks on German cities. However by the start of 1944 the German bomber force was significantly less powerful than in 1940.
At the start of the campaign the Germans had 524 bombers available, with the Ju 88 making up the biggest contribution. However not all of these aircraft would be available at the same time – only 235 bombers were available for the first night of Steinbock. However the biggest difference was in 1940 the Germans had the reserves to carry out two months of nightly raids, whereas in 1944 they had to carefully husband their resources and could carry out far fewer raids in the same time period.
This book provides an excellent study of the background to the operation, the aircraft involved, bombing methods and navigation methods used etc, before moving onto a detailed raid-by-raid account of the operation. This often demonstrates flaws with the German bomber force, in particular with navigation when trying to operate away from London, and with concentration of attacks most of the time. The improved quality of British night defences meant it was more likely that key pathfinder aircraft would be shot down in their way in, which would disrupt an entire raid, and losses were muc higher than in earlier night raids.
The conclusion demonstrates how the balance of power had changed since the original blitz. The Germans still had well trained aircrews, but many of them were very inexperienced. Some of their aircraft were getting to be outdated, with the Ju 88 and Do 217 no longer up to the task, while the He 177 was never reliable. On the British side there was now a world class night fighter in the shape of the radar equipped Mosquito, while anti-aircraft guns were radar assisted or even radar controlled, with a much higher rate of fire than in 1940. As a result German losses were heavy from the start, with thirty aircraft and 89 aircrew lost on the first day of the campaign! Navigation skills were clearly not up to the standards of 1940 – big raids on Bristol and Hull were both so unsuccessful that almost no aircraft actually reached their targets, and it wasn’t clear which cities had actually been targeted! In January-May 1944 the units involved in the campaign lost 330 aircraft to enemy action and 114 in accidents, along with many of their most experienced air crews, leaving the Luftwaffe bomber force badly damaged and in a worse position to tackle the D-Day landings.
Chapters
Chronology
Attacker’s Capabilities
Defenders’ Capabilities
Campaign Objectives
The Campaign
Analysis and Conclusion
Author: Chris Goss
Edition: Paperback
Pages:
Publisher: Osprey
Year: