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Operation Ro-Go was a sizable Japanese air offensive that had originally been aimed at reducing Allied air power in New Guinea, but instead ended up being diverted to try and stop the Allied invasion of Bougainville.
The introduction covers the purpose of the operation, gives a general outline of events, and concludes by looking at the flaws in the basic Japanese plan of relying on a series of major air attacks of limited duration. This had worked early in the war – short, sharp shocks had destroyed Allied air power in the Philippines, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, but was no longer valid in 1943, when the Americans could replace any combat loses fairly easily, using the impressive supply lines they had built up in the Pacific.
A useful map shows the distances flown by both side’s aircraft, showing that the Japanese at Rabaul and Allies at Munda were about the same distance from Bougainville. The most impressive feat of aerial navigation was the flight from Truk to Rabaul by aircraft from the Japanese First Carrier Division, by far the longest distance flown by any of the aircraft involved, and mostly over the open ocean (although also over waters still dominated by Japan).
The section on the Attacker’s Capabilities goes beyond the most obvious front line aircraft (G4M1 Betty, A6M Zero, D3A Val) to include the aerial torpedoes, and reconnaissance planes used. There is also a look at Japanese radar, which was present at Rabaul, but often ineffective. In contrast US radar was a highly effective technology by this period.
On the Defender’s side with start with a look at the logistics chain, with its key hub at Espiritu Santo, and a string of forward bases between that island and Bougainville.
The author does note that the definition of Attacker and Defender is rather hard to pin down here – in the original plan for Ro-Go the Japanese would clearly have been the attacker, but after the American invasion of Bougainville the position rather switched, with the major Japanese raids being aimed at the defence of Bougainville. At the same time the Americans were carrying out major raids on Rabaul.
Operation Ro-Go showed that the Japanese could sometimes be more flexible than they are given credit for. The operation was originally intended to hit Allied air power in New Guinea, which was starting to threaten the main Japanese positions around Wewak on the north coast. However its timing coincided with the American invasion of Bougainville, so the target of the operation was quickly altered to the protection of Rabaul, with the main target becoming the US forces on Bougainville. This rather demonstrates how the initiative in the Pacific had passed from the Japaense to the Americans by 1943.
One notable feature on both sides is chronic over-claiming. Indeed that was the case for just about every air battle of the Second World War, and can largely be explained by the chaotic nature of aerial combat, with multiple pilots at any one time, all of whom might think they had shot down the same aircraft. However the Japanese do appear to have been rather worse, especially when it came to shipping loses. The worse case came on 5 November, when the Japanese attacked a force of one patrol boat, one infantry landing craft and one tankl landing craft, but claimed to have attacked a force of two aircraft carriers and escorts! The Japanese claimed to have sunk one large and one medium aircraft carrier, two cruisers and two destroyers, when they had actually failed to sink anything,at the cost of four aircraft..
On the American side a Fifth Air Force raid on Rabaul on 2 November saw significant overclaiming, including the claim that the base had been knocked out, thus eliminating the need for further Fifth Air Force involvement… The attack did at least force the Japanese to cancel the last planned attack of 2 November.
The most effective air attack of the campaign was actually an American one, aimed at a powerful force of heavy cruisers that had been sent to Rabaul from Truk, and which could have inflicted serious damage on the US fleet at Bougainville. However on 5 November aircraft from the Saratoga and Princeton attacked this force at Rabaul, damaging five heavy cruisers and forcing the Japanese to abandon the planned attack.
It is typical of the way that events had fallen out of Japanese control that the final day of the campaign began with another major US carrier attack on Rabaul, involving two Essex class carriers and the light carrier USS Independence in one task force and the Princeton and Saratoga in a second (once again this shows how the balance of power was shifting – in 1942 a five carrier attack would have marked a major battle, not just another air raid!). The final major Japanese raid was an attack on the first of these carrier task forces, in which the Japanese were perhaps unlucky not to have hit at least one of the carriers, coming close on several occasions. However this battle did end in a very one sided American victory, with all of the 14 Kates and 17 Vals involved being shot down. It was this costly defeat that ended the operation, with the surviving Japanese carrier aircraft withdrawn to relative safety soon afterwards.
This is a valuable account of this air campaign, with far better use of Japanese sources than is often the case for this period, allowing for a much more balanced assessement of losses – the Japanese still suffered devastating losses, but on a rather smaller scale than claimed by the Allies! However Ro-Go was a total failure, failing to interfere with the attack on Bougainville and costing the IJN yet more of its irreplaceable experienced carrier air crews.
Chapters
Chronology
Attacker’s Capabilities
Defender’s Capabilities
Campaign Objectives
The Campaign
Aftermath and Analysis
Author: Michael John Claringbould
Edition: Paperback
Pages: 96
Publisher: Osprey
Year: 2023