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Although Iwo Jima is mostly known as an infantry battle, both sides deployed tanks during the fighting, with the Americans outnumbering the Japanese by four-to-one in armour.
We start with a look at the number of tanks and armoured vehicles available on each side, which gives us a first idea of how unbalanced the armoured part of the battle was. The Japanese had 35 tanks on Iwo Jima, a mix of Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks and Type 97 Chi-Ha medium tanks. On the American side there were twice as many LVT(A)-4 Amtanks (more heavily armed but thinly armoured than the Japanese tanks) and more than twice as many M4 Shermans, which outclassed the Japanese tanks in every way. The Japanese also lacked a modern anti-tank gun, with the best being the Type 1 47mm model, and that wasn’t available in significant numbers. However the Japanese did have the advantage of knowing the terrain, so many of these tanks and anti-tank guns were very well concealed and dug in (quite literally in the case of some of the tanks, dug into pits to hide all but the turret).
An interesting section looks at how the US Marines modified their tanks to cope with the various Japanese anti-tank weapons. The most striking example of this was the addition of timber protection where possible, to prevent the use of magnetic mines.
The combat section begins with a look at the LVT(A)-4s, which supported the initial landing. These proved to be very vulnerable, with 22 knocked out around the beaches – half of the initial total, although they did achieve their main objective of supporting the landings. This is followed by a brief look at the M3 tank-destroyer, a half-track carrying a 3in anti-tank gun, which proved ineffective on Iwo Jima.
The longest section looks at the tanks. We begin with a look at the problems the US tanks faced during the initial landings, which saw them struggle with the soft volcanic ash of the beaches as well as coming under fire from Japanese guns. The fighting on the open spaces of Iwo Jima’s airfield saw American tanks become rather unpopular with the American infantry, acting as shell magnets.
After this initial period the nature of the armoured warfare on Iwo Jima changed. With no more large open spaces, tanks fought in much smaller numbers, and were often vulnerable to Japanese anti-tank infantry squads. Large numbers of tanks were knocked out of action, but often the damage was repairable, and the crew survived to fight in a different tank. One example given in the text was of Private Martin Murphy, who fought in six different tanks, with five of them knocked out. Tanks may have attracted enemy fire, but the casualty rate for tank crews was only 17%, compared to a massive 60% for the infantry! The three tank battalions that fought on the island lost between 21% and 35% of their tanks, although many of the survivors had been damaged and repaired.
On the Japanese side many of the tanks were used in an aggressive way, taking part in small scale counterattacks, but they suffered heavy losses as a result. The last few tanks had to be abandoned after running out of ammo, with their crews fighting and dying as infantry.
We finish with a useful analysis of the fighting, looking in particular at how effective the improvised armour might have been (not very!), and the different between the types (not much!). The biggest different in survivability appears to have been the use of ‘wet’ ammo storage on some of the more modern Shermans, replacing the very vulnerable ‘dry’ storage in the sponsons of earlier models.
Chapters
Tanks, Other Armor and Organization
Technical Factors
Armored Warfare on Iwo Jima
Conclusion
Author: Romain Cansiere
Edition: Paperback
Pages: 48
Publisher: Osprey
Year: 2024