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Official British accounts of the Third Battle of Ypres have it ending in late November, after the Second battle of Passchendaele. In contrast the Germans consider the battle to have ended in early December. The difference is accounted for by the unsuccessful night attack examined in this book, carried out on 2 December in an attempt to improve the British position at the northern end of Passchendaele Ridge before the winter conditions made more attacks impossible.
We begin with a look at the overall Ypres campaign and the tactical developments that accompanied it. Although this battle is almost always perceived as a hopeless waste and condemned for its futile attacks across muddy wastelands, it also included periods of great British success in which a series of careful attacks took some of the strongest German positions and then turned the German habit of counterattacking against them. The Germans were greatly worried by these developments, and modified their own defensive tactics in an attempt to cope with it. Part of their new plan involved only having a very lightly defended front line. When a British attack was detected this front line would be evacuated, and both the British starting point and German outposts would be subjected to a heavy artillery bombardment. The idea of a night time attack without a preliminary bombardment was put forward in an attempt to overcome this new German tactic, the idea being that the British would be firmly established behind the German bombardment before their own artillery opened fire.
This is a very detailed attack of a fairly small scale and short lived attack. The confusion inherent in a night attack, and made worse by the poor battlefield communications of 1914-18 is illustrated by a series of extracts from recorded conversations between senior officers and the various messages they had to work with. The generals who had the job of responding to events at the front were thus operating without any clear idea of what was actually happening, and often had to cope with contradictory and erroneous reports. The bright moonlight was blamed for much of the problems at the time, with the attack taking place with just enough light for the Germans to be able to see and hit the attackers, but not enough light for the British to have a clear picture of what was going on. However it is worth noting that the initial attacks did make some progress, most of which wasn't lost until the Germans counterattacked on the following day.
Although this attack failed, it is clear that a lack of planning can't be blamed for that failure. This attack followed a series of successful attacks, which had put Passchendaele village and much of its ridge in British hands, and so there was a reasonable expectation of success here. We also get an interesting look at the extensive after action reports that were produced as part of the British army's successful attempts to improve its tactics.
One picture in this book demonstrates the perils of using contemporary maps. A map that illustrates an attack on Polderhoek Chateau shows a series of buildings surrounded by a wooded park. An aerial photo of the same location shows a landscape of overlapping water filled shell craters with a handful of ruined buildings and not a tree in sight.
This is a very valuable detailed examination of the final attack of the Third Battle of Ypres, and provides some valuable insights into the problems faced by the British army and high command late in 1917.
Chapters
1 - Antecedents
2 - Divisional Instructions & Orders
3 - A Moonlight Massacre
4 - Dawn and Dénouement
5 - Counterblow and Aftermath
6 - Conclusion
Twenty one appendices
Author: Michael Locicero
Edition: Hardcover
Pages: 432
Publisher: Helion
Year: 2014